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Abstract 
debt burden been as one of the impediments to ",{'r.nr.rrl growth a 
cause of widespread poverty in the Heavily join efforts 
the HIPCs in poverty, international donor community debt relief 
through initiatives among unilateral agreements, Paris 
Agreements, the HIPC and its successor, the Multilateral 
Debt Initiative (MDRl). these were to increase public spending 
social priority sectors and ultimately reduce incidence in HIPCs. 
This study assesses, whether the debt relief has helped to increase Government spending 
on education health sectors in Tanzania secondly, spending on 
and 
findings mcreases Government expenditure on education and health debt 
Primary and secondary school enrolments with Government 
on education and health. Institutional quality is found to significant in determining education 
spending and educational indicators. life expectancy was not found to respond to 
public spending, possibly due to the inherent gestation period in health related indicators and 
quality of data used. Nevertheless, the fmdings, though on short-run series, give an insight 
that in long-run, cumulative debt relief can contribute successes in 
fight poverty and attainment Millennium Development (MDGs). 
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1.0 Introduction 
decades, poor countries have accumulated built up through; pVTPrr", 
war-motivated lending, cheap availability of petrol dollars I m I 970s, natural 
unfavourble terms of trade, and poor domestic policies. accumulated debt became 
a "P~'U\l'C I.LIlI1',UIJ,uvjlU to economic development and poverty poorest countries. 
1980s and early 1990s many countries had external debts to 
lUUlULl' .... levels and witnessed arrears. spent between 
per cent of their annual L1U~lMV"> more than the countries 
on health and education in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) experienced difficulties with debt 
Mexico declared debt moratorium in August19822• This concern for borrowers, 
creditors and international community at community was that 
"',",'.HnHU.,."the debt crisis would trigger a global rrrrnuth and eventually 
lead to world economic recession. There was, th"..",i",r.rp to implement policies which 
would reduce debt repayments to sustainable 
Starting in the mid 1980s, bilateral initiatives under different 
platfonns were considered3• The bilateral made little impact as most of the 
indebted countries' debt obligations were institutions. To deal with 
unsustainable debt comprehensively, multilateral relief initiatives were launched mid 1990s 
spearheaded by the International Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. While reducing 
debt burden to sustainable levels the intermediate objective of the debt relief initiatives, 
the receiving governments were to use the debt relief savings estimated 
I It is estimated that due to the rise in oil western commercial banks' holding of the OPEC surpluses grew 
from US$7 billion in 1973 to US$ 115 billion in 1980. 
2 Before debt moratorium the Mexican fiscal deficit was 7.1 per cent of GDP which turned within three 
years into a surplus of 5 per cent of GDP and increased further to 8 per cent during 1988 to 1990 despite the decline 
in oil revenue by more than 7 per cent of GDP 1991), 
} Paris Club for public and and London Club for commercial non-guaranteed debts. 
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at US$I.O billion annually for poverty reduction (Jubilee, 2000). The ultimate goal was for debt 
relief to speed up the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through 
sizeable fiscal allocation to social priority sectors. This was in response to the conviction that 
external debt burden has been one of the main causes of low levels of fiscal allocations to pro­
poverty sectors and a cause of wide spread poverty in most of the HIPCs. The questions that 
remain to be answered are; first, whether debt relief savings increase social services spending 
and second whether social indicators respond to budget allocation towards the achievement of 
the MDGs. 
In answering the questions, an empirical investigation remain vital as to whether; the past debt 
relief translated into higher social services spending and how the social indicators responded. 
The rationale for empirical investigation follows the fact that, we may not objectively conclude 
the increase in Government Expenditure on priority social sectors in most of the HIPCs including 
Tanzania since early 2000 being attributable to debt relief savings alone. During the period, there 
were several factors that might have contributed to the general rise in fiscal allocation including; 
favourable relations with donor community that led to increased budget support disbursements in 
the form of grants and program loans, fiscal policy reforms in areas of expenditure discipline and 
Tax reforms supported by high economic growth and stable domestic prices, and improvements 
in governance, transparency and public accountability. 
Investigation follows the fact, Chauvin and Kraay (2005) estimated that between 1989 and 2003, 
debt relief worth US$lOO billion was granted to low-income countries. Dessy and 
Vencatachellum (2007) estimated further that about US$60 billion was granted to Africa 
between 1990 and 2004. The relief was meant to create fiscal space for higher poverty related 
spending as outlined in the receiving countries' Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks 
(MTEF), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG). Failure to streamline the debt relief savings into these sectors jeopardizes chances of 
achieving the set goals, and as a consequence, the countries may get trapped back into 
unsustainable debt positions in future through new fmancing borrowings followed by higher debt 
service payments and subsequently the deterioration of social indicators. 
2 
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Empirical literature on recent studies shows that debt the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) had positive impacts on PV"">rl!rI,tllYP on 
services and simulation improvement in from the initial 
surveys by the World Bank: that showed that the recipient were using the relief on 
poverty reduction and on these sectors increased by nearly the amount realized 
as debt relief, studies by Osei et at (2005), Chauvin (2005), Dessy 
Vencatachellum (2007), Campenhout (2007, 2008) others, found debt 
to increase to priority sectors. 
and Vencatachellum (2007) is among recent studies that extent to 
which past debt relief granted to countries during the periods 1 1994-98 
translated into voluntary higher expenditure in the 
Within the priority social "pr'''H''~'' focused on health and sectors which are 
to generate the highest their estimation, the dependent were; 
public education ,","~J\.<"U1LUl,", National Income (GNI) and public health 
as a share of (GDP). The independent were; debt 
development a"~'l"L,Cl.ll~,\.< change. The equations were 
Unrelated Regression (SUR). 
technique has consistent and efficient estimators as long as 
hand (RHS) variables are truly \.<AU'~\.<llU theory shows that most 
variables are correlated which makes thus disqualifying 
Worse still, the debt relief data 1998, excluded data for debt 
the HIPC and MDRI, ementatlCln in most HIPCs started in 2000 
Thus, the bilateral debt relief only, not 
impact comprehensively u\.<,-,au;,,", debt has not been fully 
ill including Tanzania. In bilateral debt stock was relatively small in 
most countries of the HIPCs as "",rnn(l,.".1i to that of multilateral 
3 
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was not supposed to accumulate arrears. Nonetheless, their ftndings show increases in public 
spending in education and health alongside debt relief, with quality institutions as a prerequisite. 
This dissertation, therefore, diverges from Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007) study by; including 
the omitted variables in the estimation, using V AR estimation technique instead of SUR, and 
using debt relief data up to 2007 and so capturing all forms of debt relief initiatives. Among the 
omitted variables included in this dissertation are debt stock, domestic revenue and external debt 
servIce. A recent study by Lora and Olivera (2006) found that higher debt ratios reduce 
Government social expenditures even after controlling other variables. Similarly, domestic 
revenue has a direct impact on the magnitude of resource allocation to individual sectors as 
identified by Cassimon and Campenhout (2007). External debt service has been viewed in 
literature as one of key constraints to HIPCs ftscal allocations. 
Other variables are primary and secondary education enrollments and life expectancy to capture 
improvements in education and health sectors, respectively. The focus is on Tanzania as a case 
study of HIPCs that received debt relief since mid 1980s. The main sources of data are the 
United Nations Statistics Division website, World Bank and IMF databases augmented with 
country publications and other specifted sources. With an exception of institutional quality, 
primary and secondary education enrollments, and life expectancy, all other variables are 
normalized as ratios of GDP. Data for budget variables are annual and based on ftscal years 
whereas, the rest are based on calendar years. The study covered a period of 38 years (1970 ­
2007), which is reasonably long enough for time series analysis. 
Since debt relief is a necessary but insufftcient condition for poverty alleviation in the recipient 
countries, this dissertation broaches the question of whether debt relief had any impact on 
government expenditure patterns in Tanzania. That is, it detennines whether budget allocation on 
poverty reduction has changed over time and whether social indicators have responded 
accordingly. The converse would mean that countries had neither plans nor intentions to honour 
their debt obligations and low budgetary allocation to social priority sectors altogether are not 
attributable to external debt burden. As a consequence, debt relief in such situations would not 
4 
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deliver countries out of poverty. attempt to answer 
pertaining to the objectives (i) has fiscal expenditure on 
sectors changed with debt 1980s? (ij) are the improvements 
in the and secondary school enrollments and expectancy attributable to budget 
.... ""~""JU and health respectively? 
Thus, in the questions, empirical investigation is two stages. In the first 
stage, impact external debt relief received by "H.L~""U,''''' on the fiscal allocations to 
education and is examined empirically. The seCIDna ''''''''''u,~.., the investigation by 
the em!c[s education and health expenditure on secondary school 
enrolments and respectively. The findings is significant 
m mcreasing ',n,''''1''''TYI,p>nt expenditure on both education and health. Institutional quality plays a 
positive role in oeterrnmmg to education and health though not significant with 
latter. 
The by Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007) (2007) that, debt 
relief had a of Government resources to education or 
health in countries which improved their institutions. Ttnf1.n,'1c diverge from 
previous studies in the essence that interaction of institutional quality lowers 
fiscal allocation to the sectors. fmdings on the impact of fiscal 
suggest that both primary and secondary school enrolments Government 
expenditure on education and health. 
The results however not "111".",nrt that heath expenditure 
This is probably due to with the latter. In shed 
light on how debt relief savings and the extent to which 
social priority sectors in in short-run. In addition, the fmdings 
for proposing policy measures to the benefits of debt relief savings through """""1'.'." In 
government expenditure ..,<:>tt",1"1"" 
5 
"'YnYl1t .. .-·", t 
ll 
ill
"',",'."u'u r 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
The rest the dissertation is organized into 
background information and reviews both 
and public spending on health 
methodology. Chapter Four estimates the 
estimation in Chapter Five assesses 
The last chapter concludes, with a 
indicates limitations and identifies areas 
Chapter Two presents Tanzania's 
literature on the link h",ie,,,,'<>'" 
Chapter Three provides data 
on education and health 
spending on social indicators. 
draws policy recommendations, 
6 
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2.0 Background Information and Literature Review 
2.1 Tanzania's Background Information 
reviews; the problem, the debt expenditure 
on eOllcatlon and health, development of the education and 
sectors. 
Debt Problem in Tanzania 
has been a Heavily Indebted Country (HIPC) with an ".al..11aul.,", debt situation 
even full application of traditional relief mechanisms. Prior to 
cent of Government monthly revenue was utilized to service meager 
allocation to the social priority sectors. into growth and 
rlp(!nr"!lrl poverty. Thus, due to coupled with low revenue, about 
40 the government's total or more than 100 per cent development 
have been fmanced by donors in form loans and grants. 
The of external debt has to; poor domestic 
natural calamities. The nationalizati n major means of production the 
Arusha Declaration of 1967, establishment parastatal companies 
rural settlements (Vijiji vya Ujamaa) m early and mid 1 serve as 
among the domestic expenditure 
through ,",A,"""'"" External factors, most to Tanzania included; shocks oil 
1979, the world economic of the early 1980s, collapse of 
in 1977, unfavourable terms of increases in international lntl~rp'ot 
(lending) rates in 1 and the imprudent to the developing countries by 
international banks which had accumulated excess liquidity from oil £'1.....,.,..,.,''''"" 
"petrol dollars" 1973 and late 1970s 1999). Natural calamities including 
the 1974 and 1 droughts caused serious food and low revenue from exports 
agricultural ........'11"1''':- Consequently, the imports of were on credit. 
7 
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All these factors coupled with poor economic perfonuance of 1 
forced the country to borrow both internally and externally. 
from US$ 212 million in 1970 to US$2,450 million in 1 and US$7,931 million in 
debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 122 per cent in 1 to a peak of 179 per cent 
in 1 .'H,rpnwn,pnt expenditure on social services were the victims of 
enrolment ratio 
cents in 1975176 to 0.9 and 0.7 per cents in 1989/90, 
social indicators deteriorated including gross primary school 
cent recorded in 1981 to 62 per cent in 1998. 
Public spending on education and health as 
Initiatives 
debt initiatives in different fonus since mid 1980s. The type 
initiative varied depending on the nature and source of the debt 
Bilateral Debt Cancellations 
Between 1 2001, attended the Paris Club (PC) meetings seven times to 
the v'UIall',,'-'Y 
cancelled by PC 
and rescheduled debts worth 
summarizes debt 
and in 2001 organized under the framework of 
anz,lma had debts worth US$3.3 billion 
hand, the bilateral non-PC creditors cancelled 
171.2 million Table 2.1 
4 The eligible debts for treatment under PC were the official bilateral and publicly guaranteed commercial debts 
contracted before 30th June 1986, 
8 
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Table 2-1: Debt Relief from Bilateral Creditors as at end of June 2007 
ARRANGEMENT TERMS AMOUNT CANCELLED (Millions of USD) 
PC I (Sept. 1986) Huston 2.72 
PC II 
,....PC III 
(Dec. 1988) 
(Mar. 1990) 
Toronto 
Enhanced Toronto 
19.62 
12.18 
PC rv 
I PCV 
(Jan. 1992) 
(Jan. 1997) 
London 
Naples Flows 
182.82 
861.48 
.~ 
PC VI (Apr. 2000) 
I PC VII (Nov. 2001) 
'.. 
Sub Total Bilateral PC 
Bilateral Non-PC 
Grand Total 
Cologne flows 
Cologne Stock (HIPC) 
-
~~ 
-
~ 
867.6 
1,390.90 
3,337.32 
184.6 
3,521.92 
Source: CompIled from several Quarterly Bulletms published by BoT 
Commercial debts and Export Credits 
The non-guaranteed commercial and exports credits were treated under Debt Conversion 
Programme (DCP) and the Debt Buyback Scheme. Between 1990 and 1993 Tanzania's external 
debts worth US$182 million were converted and the proceeds were invested in 82 selected 
economically viable projects under DCP. Debts worth US$199.5 million comprising both 
principal and interest were cleared under the Debt Buyback Scheme at a price of 12 cents on a 
dollar of principal tendered using Debt Reduction Facility (for IDA only countries) funded by 
IDA and the governments of Germany and Switzerland. 
Multilateral Debt Treatments 
Tanzania has benefited from three forms of multilateral debt treatments . The first was in April 
1998, when the Goverrunent established a Multilateral Debt Relief Fund (MDF) by requesting 
the donors to grant a support to cover debt service payments to the major multilateral institutions. 
Between 1998 and 2002 a total of US$212.6 million was disbursed to the fund by different 
donors and utilized accordingly. The second treatment was under the enhanced Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, aimed at cancelling external debt in flow terms to sustainable 
levels. Under the initiative, Tanzania reached Decision Point in April 2000 followed by a 
9 
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completion period reached in November 2001. As at Ue(;emlOer 2006, a of 
million was already realized from multilateral The 
treatment was under the G8 Multilateral Debt Relief (MDRI) that involved the 
multilateral creditors; the IMF, the Intemational Association (IDA) 
Development Fund (ADF). Under the institutions utilized 
commitments from the G8 members to their outstanding debts to 
UHL~UH'U ""'T1'","'" to the tune of US$3. 7 billion. 
Government Expenditure on 
Health Sector Spending and health lnf<flCtllmrs 
Since political independence in 1961, remained committed to 
financing the provision of basic Emphasis has been on 
strengthening of primary health care "P""'"""'~" as it was believed to be most cost effective. The 
commitments and efforts to increase allocation to the sector in the framework 
Poverty Reduction Strategy implementation were, however, derailed by inadequate resources. 
This was mainly because have been increasing with popu lation and 
escalating costs. To circumvent the difficulties while improving provision of health 
services, the Government, Ministry of Health, embarked on 
fmancing refonns that included strengthening budget formulation, eXIJerld 
monitoring framework; of fmancial resources from domestic sources 
development of National Health Insurance Fund and the Drug 
Fund; and 
To make the Health Sector Public Expenditure Reviews andLUUAUVLUF; 
National have been 2000 
respectively. The oeC;OIIle a of government process, 
specifically to ensure patterns of the priorities 
10 
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as stipulated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy and recently the MKUKUTA5. The NHA 
supplements the annual PER with information on the private sector and out-of pocket 
expenditure by households on health care. In combination, the two studies give a comprehensive 
picture on health expenditure in the country. The PERs and NHA have facilitated the Ministry of 
Health's preparations of the rolling three years Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
starting in 2000/01 and based on clearly defmed performance indicators within a strategic plan. 
In the aftermath of MTEF implementation, progress has been recorded in increasing budgetary 
allocation to the health sector from TZSlOO.7 billion in 1999 to TZS290A billion in 2004. 
Government spending on health as a share of total government consumption and GOP increased 
from 4.5 and 0.7 per cents in 1990 to 20.6 and 3.3 per cents in 2004 before declining slightly to 
15.7 and 2.9 per cents in 2006, respectively (Figure 2-1). 
Figure 2-1 Public Health Spending as per cent of Government Consumption and GDP 
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Source: Data extracted from United Nations Statistics Division website 
The increase in Government health spending has translated into health services delivery especially 
in terms of increased accessibility and provision of preventive and promotive health care to the 
rural poor. As chart 2-2 illustrates, the proportion of hospitals, health facilities and dispensaries 
5 Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchwni na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania (MKUKUT A) or the National Strategy for Growth 
and Reduction of Poverty 
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in good state increased from 25.5, 40.3 and 70 per cents of total in 1999 to 54.8, 75.0 and 80.8 
per cents in 2003, respectively. High levels of child immunization have been maintained which 
have culminated into the decline, by almost half, of infant mortality from 241 (per 1000 of 
children under five years) in 1970 to 122 in 2005. Life expectancy recorded an increasing trend 
from 43.5 years in 1970 to 54.5 years in 1990 before declining again to 47 years in 2005. The 
overall progress in health indicators have been undermined by several setbacks such as 
prevalence of HIV; poor infrastructure especially in the rural areas where the majority live; 
mismatch between health care needs and available resources and escalating costs of health 
facilities and medicines. 
Figure 2-2 Facilities in Good State and Government Expenditure on Health 
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Source: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare - (URT) Annual Health Statistical Abstract, 2006 (Figure 1. 12, 14) 
Education Sector Spending and Educational Indicators 
One of the key objectives of the 1967 Arusha Declaration was to ensure that basic social services 
were available equitably to all Tanzanians. In the education sector, the goal was translated into 
the 1974 Universal Primary Education (UPE), whose objective was to make primary education 
universally accessible, compulsory, and provided free of cost to ensure that it reached the 
poorest. Large-scale increases in the numbers of primary schools and teachers were realized. For 
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was strategically 
instance, by the beginning of in Tanzania had a school 
100 cent as rrm",.,,·rt toprimary school enrollment cent in the 
1960s (Terme, 2002). 
deterioration of terms oil prices, high debt service costs in the 1980s among 
others translated to poor performance and consequently low revenues 
culminating into inadequate provision of social services including education sector. 
Moreover, a 3 per cent rate of population during the 1 led to increased 
to mitigate the 
the Structural 
"''''IuaII.... for an additional strain on sector. 
problem, the IMF and the World 
Adjustment Programmes Vy,,,,,,,-·y cost sharing 
enrollment fees and other contributions that increased nrr,,,",,,,,,,,,, 
primary school 
through mid 1990s. The 
policy worsened the situation as enrollments in primary " .... ,..,,",..v """".lL'I"U to just above 60 
per cent in mid 1990s high scores of early 1980s while illiteracy ""('r",.,,,,,,11 10 per cent 
in 1986 to 16 per cent in 1 
The transformation IMF and World Bank to country specific Poverty 
Reduction and (PRGF) placing poverty at centre, benefited the 
education sector Linked to the PRGF is the attached to the HIPC 
initiative and MDRI recipient countries n"p'n,,,·,,. a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) measures it undertakes to poverty. As in most HIPCs 
education is in the centre ofpoverty reduction in primary education were 
eliminated in the 2000 and also included as a completion point in 
2001. The policy donor support including a Bank 
and a number commitments, all coordinated 
Development (PEDP). According to 
to the MDGs and to address the critical facing primary education. 
The four components: enrolment expansion, quality improvement, capacity­
6 The Minister for Education and Vocational Training the 
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and strengthening of institutional ",.,."YH1,prrIPI'.,.t" The ofPEDP has led to 
a number of successes that suggest to be achieved 
the Vision 2015 target. Sitta (2007) as follows: 
(i) 	 Enrolment in pre-primary education from 554,835 children in 2004 to 795,011 
children in 2007, an increase of43.3 per 
The number of primary schools and enrollment increased from 11,873 and 4.4 
200 I to 15,624 million in 2007, respectively while net enrolment rate 
improved 58.8 to cent in 2007; 
(iii) The book to 	 student in 2000 to 1:3 in 2007 following the 
introduction of capitation schools. Eventually, the 
Leaving Examinations' ",,,,rr,,,p-n from per cent in 2000 to cent in 
2006, with the transition rate to seClonolarv schools rising from 20.3 per cent in 2000 to 
per cent in 2007; 
(iv) Recruitment 	of new 45,796 rea,:::ners while a total of 50,813 previously 
primary school trained, upgrading their to 
qualification 
(v) 	 Teaching and learning have improved through the 
new classrooms quality houses for teachers. 
are still challenges that are likely to affect the sustenance and 
attainment of among others: the necessary infrastructure to meet the 
rising demand for pnmary professional teaching skills, of the 
ofcare and to pupils 
affected by 
Despite 
disbursed 
14 
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2.2 Review 
There are perspectives to when reviewing literature on the impact debt 
relief on fiscal spending patterns, particularly on social priority sectors and the response of social 
indicators. Theoretical and empirical literature is either based or up on 
The first relates to sustainability budget in which a debtor is 
unable to adequate resources to services due to resource gap. 
gap requires fmancing that can either be in form of 
grants or loans as in the uu,,"-.~ ... models, The second to a situation a 
debtor's capacity to fmance social services is constrained by "LL'_alJ'''' service costs, 
evidence of such perspective occurs when payment arrears accumulate debt is rescheduled or 
forgiven. A third perspective relates to political economy, which deals with 
prioritization in terms fiscal allocations among social services, and prestige, 
accumulate external debt arrears without spending in 
and not of budget political 1S linked to 
institutional quality as a function of good and transparency by implication 
relief would not Another to a a country's foreign 
rp(]"m,p n,prClnp£"tl 
burden is too to adversely development of whether it is 
to the debt vicious in or not at all. This is significantly 
or simply sustainability and it s a typical ofHIPCs. 
most of these cannotnPt'Cn"l'tl the 
fiscal priority sectors the widespread has been blamed 
Thus, debt may not be considered 
and as; it intrinsically countries with poor management 
penalizes those that managed their economies prudently (Dessy and Vencatachellum, 2007). 
debt relief may encourage moral hazards as the beneficiaries may resort back to reckless 
borrowing after debt cancellation. Third, debt relief may overestimate feed up resources if the 
used to CP,....l1t'P a fraction of debt CHHU\T1C prior to the debt which is 
very common in the arrears are accumulated on commercial and bilateral debts 
15 
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(Bird Milne, 2003), Fourth more expenditure is fungible not 

mean that additional resources translate into ,nr,'p"" 

The subsequent sections of this "U'>'~<''''l nrpcpnt both theoretical and PTYln,,', ... 

debt relief with fiscal allocation to priority sectors, the response of and 

literature evaluation to identify the that this study seeks to fill. 

2.2.1 Theoretical and Social Sector Development 
earliest theoretical capacity of developing back to the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. include those ,HU,""A'''-' 
and Gulhati (1960), Alter (1 et al. (1964) context from 
which these studies was the rapid growth in public and a 
growing concern with flows in the post-war period. especially 
after the emergence crisis in early 1980s, literature on capacity has expanded 
considerably, though the ""r\l't>,,,t of debt capacity has been very to pin down with any 
degree of precision or consensus. Moreover, theoretical on initiatives is still 
underdeveloped to newness. 
To a large models link debt burden to eco,nOlIDC growth and magnitude of 
public not extend explicitly to in expenditure patterns save for 
debt relief initiatives. using the are drawn that link debt relief 
to increased social ,",pr'u,f'."" spending directly and indirectly. debt cancelation increases 
the budget to accommodate more priority areas, and 
indirectly debt saves investible resources to boost translates into 
higher revenue that increases available resources allocation to social nr1,nrll-u 
sectors. are expected to respond ''''('(\r,rl1n,(Y of whether the 
is or Moreover, the effectiveness delOerlGS on whether or not 
16 
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initiatives are based on sound diagnostic and deep understanding of the causes of debt crises in 
the recipient countries. 
Despite the presence of various theoretical models that link debt with social services delivery, 
the emphasis in this dissertation is on the Debt Traps and the Debt Overhang model. This model 
is widely named after author Jeffrey D. Sachs (2002) and is contented as one of the latest models 
that links debt crisis, debt relief and economic growth. The background of the model is based on 
the perspective that poor countries are vulnerable to a poverty trap attributable to excessive 
external debt burden. 
In equation (2.1), savings s equal zero when income y is less than a minimum real level of 
consumption m to meet basic needs. When income y exceeds the minimum level of 
consumption m, the household will save a fraction (J of excess income (y - m) . 
{;:~(y-m) ii:::;}.................................................... {2.1) 

Equation (2.2) equates income y level to output q plus foreign aid inflow f minus the external 

debt service payments d. 

y==q+ f -d........................................................................................ (2.2) 

Output q is assumed to be a linear function of reproducible capital k as given in equation (2.3) 
with A representing the standard notation for technology. 
y = Ale ......... .......................................................................................(2.3) 
Capital accumulation is assumed to follow the standard accumulation pattern as gIven m 
equation (2.4), where n is population growth rate and /i is the depreciation rate of reproducible 
capital. 
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The model is built on two net debt service does 
not fully cover basic f d <m, and Oi) the eCOnOITIV a growth 
when income level exceeds the threshold level, that is, -8 n>O. 
The fundamental idea the model is that the economy or shrinks depending on the 
of capital k. by implications, (equation: a threshold between growth 
...................................................... (2.5) 
Where k+ as shown in (2.3) is the level where savings equals capital 
that; (i) TAr,.. ,.. ... 
and decline occurs when; 
widening, that s (n +8)k. At this po int there is no rrt'A',uth as can only meet 
capital gap. 
Figure 2-3 ~rt"Ulf'" Model with Minimum Capital Threshold 
__---r-------£i = Ak 
_------~~=-------------s 
growth occurs stock of per capita capital is below k + where 
the amount savmgs to to labour ratio constant in relation to 
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population growth and depreciation is not 	 s «n+o). Depending on 
much below the actual level of capital k is 
(i) 	 When the initial level of capital is not to cover basic needs, savings per capita 
will equal zero and the economy will PYrIPr1,pn(" negative growth at the rate of- (n +0). 
That is when; 
k < (m +d - f)j A < k'; then s =0 dk/dt +o)k .......... .............(2.6) 
(ii) 	 When the initial level IS infliction point k', but still enough to cover 
basic consumption the point where savi gs s zero 
and the same outcome of occur similarly to the path in 
the first scenario 
(m+d- f)/A<k< ,7) a{Ak+f d m)-(n+o)k<O.......... 

(iii) 	 Finally, given that k > k' the will grow at a rising rate state 
K E at a positive rate that asymptotically approaches A0' - 0 - n . 
The model implies that, economy's actual capital stock k is below k* I is 
caught in a poverty is undermined by; debt payments, basic ",v""... ,u~",,,.u 
needs in the depreciation of the capital stock. out of the 
poverty trap, to HIPCs in form of f or a 
decrease in p'vtprt"" "'H1TY'lp·nTC d. the outcome of debt enough 
to move initial level k above infliction capital the economy 
start to grow. 
Figure (2.4) growth of output, for 
payments and The economy; grows when k > k' , k< and 
stagnates when k k' . in foreign aid or reduction in external debt of L\ reduce 
19 
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the threshold level of capital by dk =-atJ./(ACJ - 8 - n) to a new threshold level k'. It is hence 
assumed that L'l is sufficient to reduce the threshold level to a point where actual stock of capital 
k is above k*. Consequently, the outcome of debt relief will shift the output growth curve 
upward by the amount L'l/ok. The implication of the model with respect to the impact of debt 
relief is that, the economy that was shrinking because of debt burden will start growing as long 
as k' shifts below k as a result of debt cancelation. 
Figure 2-4 Effects of Debt Relief on Economic Growth 
Output 
growth 
o 
Growth with debt relief and increased 
increased foreilm assistance 
Capital stock 
Source: Jeffrey D. Sachs (Figure 1: Po 7) 
However, the Sachs model is not immune to criticisms. The strict assumption that debt relief will 
increase savings in the HIPCs, may not be justifiable given the moral hazard problems and lack 
of proper functioning institution that could ensure good governance and accountability. There is 
no guarantee that debt relief will increase savings to be channeled into productive investments, 
which calls for necessity of conditionalities. The model also implies that the debtor country has 
been servicing debt accordingly while in practice most of the HIPCs have been accumulating 
arrears especially with bilateral and commercial credits. 
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2.2.2 on of Debt ReHef on Social Sectors Development 
There are relatively few that have assessed the effects of debt service 
on the composition of save for their mixed findings. Precisely, there is little in 
depth analytical literature of the link the recent comprehensive debt relief initiatives and 
public social services spending, albeit fact that, the recent studies came up with short-term 
based fmdings. The recent debt involving to a large extent the "V"","""",,;I1... 
multilateral debts have not in as the cancellation of 
UI ... ",","""',",! on improvements inthese debts may not be felt 
social indicators. Even so, by allocations towards pro­
poverty have changed with debt m indicators in the short-
run give a promising insight of 
Debt Reliefand Government n.t;oe,flUlfUI"e on Social 
Empirical work on on expenditure on social services 
to cross countries studies " .......'IIU,U.;; can be categorized into two 

second relating to country countries studies include work by 
et al. (2002), Kraay (2005), Lora and and Vencatachellum (2007), 
USA Network (2007), and Cassimon (2007). Country specific studies 
(2002) and Osei et al. (2005).include those by Nannyonjo (2001), Kimalu (2002), 
Initial surveys by the World Bank show that, on "1-',,",'UU,U"l5 on poverty reduction as a 
share of total government spending in the cent in 1998 to 54 cent in 
2004 as a result of debt relief. The fmdings were <"""",,,-1"»11 (2007) 
who found that debt relief has already brought C10nltlf' For 
vital"'Ud"U'" used savings from debt relief, 
sofor those affected by drought and 
debt relief primary school The 
debt relief fight HIV, and to provide water. Hn;LUU11J 
7 The successor ",am"",,,,,,,, to the U.S. Chapter of Jubilee 2000 
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savings of around US$70 million annually to vaccinate children tetanus, whooping cough 
and diphtheria, and to build and supply electricity to schools, while 140 million 
per year savings were used to launch a national HIV IAIDS plan education, 
testing, and mother-to-child abatement. The improved the 
country's basic infrastructure, rural feeder roads, expenditure on 
education and health care. Honduras allocated savings to 
matmg school For HI1YI1,.,.rI it was possible to allow an additional 300,000 children to 
primary schools in 2005. 
assessing the extent to which the 00 billion worth of debt to low-income 
countries between 1989 and 2003 have government expenditure on in 62 
low income countries, Chauvin (2005) found mixed results. that 
countries all was no statistical relief 
the period 1989 1993 of government and 
period 1994 - 1 the second estimation, with a of the 
involved being non-African, was a strong relationship between debt relief 
during the period 1994 - 1998 with government expenditure in the sectors for the period 
. The authors attributed poor quality data as the reason for the 
is worth noting that, the difference in difference technique used by Chauvin and (2005) 
not be appropriate in investigating reSDUnSt:s as savmgs in one 
It 
in most ofare to be used in the same not in the next five 
with low domestic revenue relative to PV''\P'I1,n,I"'lrP The method 
">"..,.".....,,,t,, in investigating the responses due to the 
notably, debt used in up in 1999 and included only the bilateral 
and I'Atnrt1,prl' relief initiatives leaving multilateral debt initiatives which would 
impact given the fact that, high proportions of the HIPCs debts were to 
and were serviced accordingly. 
8 Kraay identi fled and Yemen to have influenced the results in the where majority ofthe 
candidate countries are from Latin America. 
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LUV'<A'v, study by Lora and Olivera (2006) the period 1985 and 2003 on whether 
debt crowds out services used a sample 50 countries found that, even after 
controlling for other variables, higher ratios reduce ao'IlPrnrr,p social The 
authors comes mostly from stock and not debt service 
citing the to reduce room indebtedness through loss of credibility. 
fmdings if hold, that the of debt relief debts have 
under HIPC MDRI should their expenditure in services This 
implication, however, may induce more reckless and a subsequent re-accumulation of 
new debt in the case of irresponsible Governments. fmdings coincide with the Gupta et al. 
(2002) conclusion that, the initiatives will '''''''''''''''.It,,, for public on 
formulation, and reporting 
On country specific, Nannyonjo (2001) showed between 1998/99 and 2000101, debt relief 
in Uganda at UGX 268 billion were used to expenditure on priority 
poverty reduction programs through Ugandan Poverty Fund (PAF). Budget 
expenditure on education increased national budget in 1995/96 to 19 per 
cent in 1998/99 and eventually led to the launch education to 
health expenditure from 2.9 per cent four children per family. Likewise 
1998/99 to 13 cent in 2000101 and is in the U!".Ul.U",. HIV / AIDS. 
The are supported by and Nabbumba (2004) studies on HI PC relief and 
"''''.'AMru reduction in Uganda who the resources allowed Uganda to 
increase the budget the most critical areas such as water supply 
altogether in to primary and primary health care. sanitation, and 
A by Nafula (2002) on how can debt achieve sustainable Primary 
that introduction cost sharing had adverse effects on Education in Kenya 
education with low enrolment rates and high dropout rates the consequences. 
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proposed using from the debt initiatives to and to away with cost 
at primary leve I, and to other subsidies as meals day 
and increase number of trained '",,"_U''' The findings are in line with the on the 
determinants of primary school enrolment in Kenya by et ai, (2004) 
as one of the obstacles. on empirical it was concluded 
reducing primary in Kenya to zero may translate a 10-12 per cent In 
enrolment raIse gross to more than 100 cent. 
Empirical Studies on the Tanzania's context 
Literature on impact debt relief on allocation and ultimately improvements in 
indicators in ULU~UUL" IS very despite early studies that identified debt 
as one of the critical to budget a cause of theClll"''''ClClV 
poverty9 Investigating the between performance 
accumulation indebtedness in Kilindo (1993) a multiple<>UL,'UUU, 
showed 
in budgets had significant effects on accumulation in tum, through 
widens the fiscal gap in the subsequent period, thus 
equation included both "",,,,,,T.I' and external ill debt crisis. 
into a debt ""'''"•• <' 
circle, with spending on social sectors as shock absorbers in the process. The if 
hold, imply that a fall in debt payments as a result debt relief reduces budget deficit, 
thus the debt and consequently increasing social spending. 
Bigsten et al. a Computable Equilibrium (CGEM) in study on 
the debt relief offered the HIPC on growth in alli~anla and 
assessment was on impact debt on increased l'rA',IP,..·nrnpnt spending in 
the effect of public spending as either consumption or 
modest regardless of whether it is consumption or investments that is 
Therefore, considering HIPC savings as additional resources to demand 
The study carried out simulations a period ofnot generate any ;>UL';>'Cl'U 
9 For more studies on the effects of unsustainable debt in Tanzania see among V'AkOlnJU:l (1990), Mjema 
(1994), Njau and Noni (1997) and Mbelle (2002). 
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four years, which is too to assess the impact investment especially in 
human capital on Moreover, the savings from the 
traditional debt as well the latest comprehensive MDRI which could have altered 
if not changed the "''''-'U'f;'' 
On whether debt relief can poverty in Tanzania, 1) that, while in 
theory debt reduction may favorably, is only justifiable under 
non-reversal He concludes that, debt initiatives should not 
thought to cause eCOIn01TIlC growth on their own, but rather as complementary to the 
imp lementation of sound crcleC'On()mIC policies in order for Tanzania to attain the MDGs. 
The Debt Relief, Conditionalities and the Role ofInstitutional Quality 
use of funds saved from initiatives are guided 
reduction strategy as outlined in updated in 
World Bank, civil society and The str<lte~:IeS in the 
oriented in order to encourage to adopt policies that will and 
improvements in the the poor. Empirical studies on of 
m recipient countries found institutional quality to playa significant role. 
the debt relief initiatives would not achieve their objectives unless adopt 
good governance. 
by Arslanalp and Henry (2004) lack of good institutions as one 
problem faced by countries receiving in translating the benefits 
"P""f1f"~" spending. In the same line, Nafula (2002) that without conditionalities, are 
possibilities of diverting debt to increased military and/or 
to new borrowings back to unsustainable debt levels. 
(2007) supported institutions in their study indicating that 
development were not statistically significant in ""~/lalUU'15 
allocation to health and in GOP unless interacted with 
po litical institution. They "Ull"ll'U that conditioning debt relief to 
,,"lAY''''I''.'' 
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reforms through increased accountability is required for countries to allocate proportionately 
more resources to social services. Their conclusion is in line with Cooper and Sachs (1985) who 
argue that without conditionalities, a government with a high discount factor will rather consume 
than invest in infrastructure and human capital once debt relief is obtained. 
Debt Reliefand Improvements ofSocial Indicators 
It is evident from the foregoing empirical fmdings that debt relief increases public spending in 
social sectors including education and health - ceteris paribus. However, allocation of additional 
spending to these sectors is not the end at itself but leads to the need to bring about the desired 
reduction in poverty. In order to determine reduction in poverty, there should be assessments of 
whether or not the poverty related social indicators of the fmanced sectors are responding 
accordingly. It would, therefore, be of value to monitor the benefit incidence by conducting 
periodic surveys as outlined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers of the HIPCs benefiting 
from the HIPC Initiative and MDRI. 
Empirical fmdings further show that increases in budgetary allocation to priority sectors have 
significant positive impacts on social indicators. Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004) have found that 
higher budget allocation had significant improvement in social service delivery and noticeably 
decline on poverty in Uganda. In particular, the 9 per cent annual increase in government 
expenditure on education between 1999 and 2002, in line with Uganda's UPE policy, has 
contributed to the increase in the gross primary enrolment from 2.6 million pupils in 1999 to 7.3 
million in 2002 with the gender gap closing. Other achievements included; (i) the fall in 
HIV / AIDS prevalence rates from 14 per cent in the mid-1990s to 6.5 per cent during 2001-2002, 
(ii) increase in the share of the rural road network being maintained fro m 20 per cent in 1997-98 
to 60 per cent in 2000, and (iii) improvements in access to safe water from 40 per cent nationally 
in 1997 to 52 per cent in 2001. In totality, it was estimated that poverty incidence had fallen from 
56 per cent in 1992 to 35 per cent in 2000. The achievement is in line with the attainment of the 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan and MDGs targets for Uganda. 
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debt could improve education, et aL (1997) et 
(l two of Kenya, one 
provision of fmancial assistance to buy text books 
to a control group of students in schools that did not get 
additional study also showed that class sizes increased considerably as 
schools that received the additional funds. The 
jo'V'errum:nts could enrolments and reduce dropout rates by using the debt relief 
(2000) and Ainsworth et al. (2002) found that enrollment rate 
<U}.L,(lU,I(l was among the lowest in the world. They also established 
were below the average for Africa, with the first year of 
beyond the mandatory enrollment age of seven years. 
The enrolment was most affected at the primary level 
were maternal orphans and an adult death, and other costs 
of schooling that include 
schools also affected parents' U"'~,l""JU" implication of the fmdings is 
that the use of debt provide teaching materials 
increases education enrollment rates. and Oxfam (1999) 
estimates that, achieving Africa would 
cost between an amount to between 17 
per cent and 33 per cent 
2.2.3 Evaluation of the 
There are limitations to in practicability with 
respect to debt relief. a for the empirical evidence 
on how debt relief can used to to allocation caused by debt stock and 
debt service payments. 
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summary both cross countries and country empirical that 
budgetary spending on health and education, <''''"'-',,"," other priority social sectors, have .n"'r",,,,,,,,"" 
following the implementation of debt Particularly, substantial empirical 
evidence suggests that debt relief savings could primary and secondary school enrolments, 
reduce drop-out rates and increase completion rates. health services improvements, 
IS limited empirical evidence (probably to short-time since inception of 
t'nrYl"Y'ph'''ncnrp debt relief of health indicators that are 
long lags expenditure and indicators' responses. 
Nevertheless, the identified poverty in the early cases under the debt 
initiatives has been uneven across It is not all countries that have developed 
comprehensive poverty reduction Even where these are in 
have typically not incorporated targeted improvements in 
indicators. This makes difficult assessment of V"'...",..",,,, in poverty as a 
relief savings. Worse still, even in countries with specific and ""'''''''''!1r<l on 
social indicators, there are no tracking mechanisms on debt relief released resources to ensure 
they reach the intended clientele. 
Basing on the above, most ended up in investigating how 
res'Dorlo to debt most traditional debt relief initiatives that were and 
inadequate as debt treatments. Some other on 
simulations on in raising social indicators but not .nt',"rn,",." debt 
relief data explicitly in their 111VU,",',.,. are no studies, as yet, that examined 
explicitly the on allocation to health and education sectors in 
Tanzania, leave alone on budgetary allocation to these sectors into improvements 
in social services. intends to address that gap by all debt relief 
initiatives granted to <1U"",,""1<1 as a case study ofHIPCs. 
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3.0 Data and Methodology 

chapter discusses the methodology for this study, U5'1LllJ'5 the sources of data, choice 
justification of variables, the research model, tests, and the 
vector error I"Ar'T{>('-t, estimations. 
3.1 Sources and Variables Justification 
of government spending on social priority sectors consideration of an array of 
factors that influence budgetary Sturm, 2001 and Fielding, 
tAu""I.-U'-',"" o,r.,,,,'rn1rn{>,nt revenue, GDP, inflation, 1997) shows that political 
exchange rates, availability new new debts, legal 
institutional frameworks, factors that influence 
government expenditure patterns. Most are qualitative in nature and may not 
easily measurable as they require and perceptions of individuals that 
are likely to be subjective and biased. and fmancial constraints, this is 
to secondary data of the variables in recent studies to have influence on 
allocation lO . In the first instance, two measures f expenditure on social services are 
(1) the ratio of government eXj:len,Qj on education to GDP (EDUC), and (2) 

expenditure on health as a Data for the period 1998 - 2007 was collected 

from the Economic period 1970-1997 was obtained 
Nations Statistics Division (http://data.un.orgJ). In the second case, three measures 
improvements in are considered focusing on; primary (PREN) and 
(SeEN) school and life expectancy (LFXP) for health. Data 
output social indicator Xuereb et al. (2005). The input variables in 
the estimation are; international official (INOT), 
""I.-v",..",! 
debt (EXDB),institutional 
domestic revenue 
10 See for instance studies McGillivray and (2002), McGillivray and Ouattara Remma 
Chauvin and Kraay (2005) and Cassimon and Campenhout (2008), 
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3.1.1 Input Variables 
Debt Relief 
External is a key in the thus, its on government 
expenditure on and health is To estimate the magnitude debt relief 
granted to <.UU.,<.HUU., the debt relief data in NPV by Chauvin (2005)" is 
adopted for the period 1988 - 2003. Data for last three years (i.e. 2004 is extracted 
from various Quarterly and Monthly economic reports of the Tanzania. The 
NPV of debt is favoured against nominal values, as the former ,-."'.,t......"''' all forms of debt 
cancellations and while the latter the cancellation 
effects only. in fact magnitude of debt normalization, the 
debt relief was as a share ofGDP. A correlation is expected t\pt'",p'>n debt relief and 
government Py,.pn,/1 on the chosen sectors. 
International Official Transfers (INOT) 
All do not involve of external funds the economy as the two­
gap suggest That it not augment but rather 
and/or intertemporal of domestic resources. the debt relief to 
contribute to the attainment of the as intended, it be complemented by 
International Official Transfers (INOT) that provides fresh and Vencatachellum 
(2007) identified Tanzania and Mozambique as the major t''''f''n'''P·,..rC of INOT in Sub 
Africa having been granted billion and US$16.9 billion, respectively ",,,,t'U!""'''' 
1990 2004. The INOT is in the model to deduce viability of the assertion that 
in budget allocation to spending in developing may be attributable to 
....""'0'<>1 support inflows debt relief Increased foreign aid in 
budget support would to expenditure on public 
investment as was established by et al. (2005) Kerrl1l1er (2004). INOT 
to Kraay for providing the debt relief dataset in Net Present Value (NPV) tenns for the 
2004. Data for the last three years are in nominal tenns as obtained from the BoT publications ...(\",,,r1,"1'11 
relief under HIPC and I\!IDRI that involved no rescheduling but thus, it would not make a 
difference in nominal tenns. 
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were obtained from the United Nations Statistics which they were 
as share ofGDP. 
Institutional Quality 
the strong conditions attached to debt and other recent official transfers is for the 
countries to reform their institutions and adopt governance principles 13. In 
institutional quality In uses the Marshall and Jaggers 
(2007) Polity IV database. The institutional is computed as an average of three 
variables: (1) regulation of chief executive 
recruitment, competitiveness of executive recruitment, (2) 
executive constraints, and (3) political participation The Polity IV score ranges 
from -10 (high autocracy or poor governance) to +10 or quality governance). 
Basing on this measure, the improved since mid 1980s 
consistent with political and in 1970 to In 
2007. The quality of a country's "'V'~"'l'tprt to impact the allocation and 
of freed-up resources from debt 1rl"r1".~C' as was found by Kimenyi (2006). The 
down effects of the Government allocated resources to intended improvement in 
services depend very much on the quality governance. 
Debt stock 
(2006) the period 1985 and 2003 using a recent Lora and 
of 50 ("<"' •• rlt.e,,,",, controlling for other variables, higher debt 
comes mostly from the debt stock that 
reduces room for country's credibility is by 
debts have been cancelled under andimplications, the beneficiaries 
reduce (H""PT'1nn'lpnY 
MDRI, should in social services increased new 
12 McGillivray and M"M"oo"" (2001) noted that these data are a donor measure of gross aid mostly reflecting 
commitments and may not to the actual flows of funds into the fiscal 
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that effect, external debt balance (EXDB) is included in the estimation and is expected to 
undermine public expenditure in social services. The EXDB data was obtained from the United 
Nations Statistics Division website and where necessary augmented with data from BoT 
publications. As with other variables, debt stock is normalized as a ratio ofGDP. 
Domestic Revenue 
Domestic revenue (DREV) has a direct impact on the magnitude and direction of all other budget 
variables. A study by Cassimon and Campenhout (2007) on the effectiveness of aid, debt relief 
and public fInance response, using a panel of HIPCs showed that, increase in government 
revenue IS followed by an increase in government expenditure. The expenditure on social 
services is, therefore, expected to increase with DREV. Data for domestic revenue is obtained 
from government annual budget estimates and annual economic surveys. The domestic revenue 
data used in the study consists of both tax and non-tax revenue and where available inclusion of 
proceeds from privatization and dividends from Government agencies and corporations. 
Interaction of Variables 
The fmdings by Burnside and Dollar (2000) study on Aid, Policies and Growth, suggest the need 
to investigate the extent to which the marginal benefIts from EXDR interact with a country's 
institutional quality (INST) in order to bring about the desired impact. Studies by Osei et al. 
(2005), Chauvin and Kraay (2005) and Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007), for instance, suggest 
that debt relief could have potential impact when linked with policy and institutional reforms in 
the recipient countries. In our estimation, such potential effects on government expenditure in 
education and health are deduced by interacting EXDR with INST to form a variable DRlNST. 
The hypothesis is that EX DR and INST are strategic complements and expected to have a 
positive relationship with expenditure on social services. 
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3.1.2 
Primary Enrolment 
that education is a key in eradicating poverty. Hence 
linking to education is one way in which the will benefit from the HIPC 
Initiative 14. is one of the key MDGs justifYing as one of the potential 
subsectors to be using debt relief savings in most education is in 
different levels, primary, secondary and instance by 
Nandwa and (2007) have shown that primary ...,u.\-,,,a,c,vu relative to 
other levels in the countries, A more breathing space in the 
government leads to higher on education and is 
expected to primary school enrollments. 
Secondary School 
Secondary school IS identified as a second to rimary contributing to 
Tanzaniaeconomic growth in and particularly in building 
has recently witnessed of secondary education 
and Government initiatives to meet increasing demand for 
In this context, ",",',V1Il.J.al 
v",,·('t,·t1 that increase in government 
been 
using debt 
growing number of primary school 
included in the estimation. It is 
relief savings would facilitate school facilities as well as avenues 
for higher education. 
Life expectancy 
Although there are several such as, child mortality access to 
health facilities, doctors/nurses HIV/AlDS cases, and the like, is to 
Better health facilities lengthen translate these into positive factors altering 
expectancy. It is in that context, this study for expectancy (LFXP) as one 
14 For more literature see for instance, work by Mwabu et al. (I 2000), et al. (2001) and 
Mwabu (200 I). 
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proxies for health sector perfonnance. This move is made despite the fact that LFXP is a long­
run response measure of both systematic short and long-run formulation and implementation of 
fiscal and health policies. Since data on life expectancy is published in five-year intervals, a 
moving average technique was used to generate annual data in between the intervals. 
3.2 The Model 
Traditionally, fiscal response models are estimated in the structural form using a nonlinear 3­
Stage Least Square (3SLS) method. The technique, however, has a problem of being extremely 
sensitive to the starting values (Cassimon and Campenhout, 2007). This study follows the Osei et 
al. (2005), and estimates the model in a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) modeling framework's. 
The V AR technique is favoured due to the fact that, macroeconomic and fiscal aggregates, in 
particular, are highly interlinked creating the possibility of endogeneity as suggested by Engle 
and Granger (1987) and Fagernas and Roberts (2004). Moreover, the technique enables graphing 
impulse response functions, which is a convenient method in evaluating the effects between two 
variables of interest. This study therefore employs the VAR model of the fonn; 
Xt =rAXt - 1 + f/JzXt - 2 +... +¢pXt _ p+ lPY, +Ct.· •••••••• ••••••.•.•••...•••••......••••••••••••......•••••• (3.1) 
Where; p is the lag length, X t is a (m x 1) vector of jointly determined J(I )variables, l'r is a 
(q xl) vector of deterministic variables and each ¢i (i = 1,2,... , p) and lP are (m x m) and (m x q) 
matrices of coefficients to be estimated using a (t = 1,2,... , T) sample of data. E: t is a (m x 1) 
vector of nonnally and identically distributed disturbances with zero mean and non-diagonal 
covariance matrix, L. 
15 Since our interest is not investigation of fiscal response per se as with case for Osei et al.(2005), the variables in 
the Model are different. 
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Since all the variables in our model are treated as endogenous due to theoretical linkages among 
the fiscal variables, equation (3.1) is transformed for estimation by omitting the deterministic 
variables to become; 
X t =rAXt-1 + (AXt-2 +... + ¢pXt_p+ cr········· ................. ..................................... (3.2) 

The estimation of model presented in equation (3.2) is in two stages; first stage estimates the 
impact of debt relief on fiscal allocation to social priory sectors and second investigates to what 
extent the fiscal expenditure has translated to improvement in the sectors. 
In estimating the impact of debt relief on government expenditure on education and health, the 
vector variables in (3.2) will be defmed as; 
Xt == (EDUCt' HEALt, EXDBp EXDRt, EXDSt, INOTt,INST;, DRE~,DRINST; ). ........ ( 3.3) 

In estimating the improvements in primary and secondary school enrolments and life expectancy 
attributable to fiscal allocation on education and health, the vector variables in (3.2) will be 
defmed as; 
The first and second stage estimations and interpretations of the results are presented in chapter 
four and five, respectively. 
3.3 Estimation Technique 
As procedures of estimations based on times series require, we first test for stationarity to avoid 
spurious regressions. In case of non-stationary time series, we test for co integration relationships 
to establish long-run equilibrium solutions among the variables in accordance to the economic 
theories. 
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3.3.1 Stationarity Tests 
This study employs, both Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillip Perron (PP) tests to 
examine the stationarity of each of the series. Conventionally, statistical estimations are based on 
the assumption that data series are stationary, though there is substantial evidence in literature to 
suggest that many macroeconomic time series may possess unit roots. The stationarity criterion 
ensures constancy of the mean, variances, and autocovariances through time (Judge, 1988), that 
is, to ensure that the moments of the stochastic processes do not depend on time 16. The 
consequences of estimations based on non-stationary series involve detection of strong and 
statistically robust relations but spurious and thus invalidate estimators and forecasts made based 
on the established relationships. 
Formally, the ADF test uses the regression of the first differences (M/) of the series against the 
Jagged once series, (XI_I) and lagged difference terms (M/_,), that is, it takes into account the 
autoregressive process (AR(p)). The variables are tested with a constant a without a linear trend 
term. The ADF takes the form; 
M, =a + jJX1_ + I:I y;M/_; + c1 ; c, - I1D(O, (J2) ................................. ...(3.5)
1 
The ADF is used to test the null hypothesis of Ho : jJ =o(non-stationary) against the alternative 
Ho : jJ < 0 (stationary). Given the AR(P) process, whereas p denotes a number of lags, an 
inadequate number of lags tends to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity whereas, too 
many lags reduces the power of ADF, hence an appropriate number of lags will be determined 
using Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)17 and Schwarz Criteria (SIC). However, the economic 
series may have to be differenced before stationarity can be assumed to hold (Engle and Granger, 
1 
16 Given non -stationary series the variance of Var(Yr) =L0'2 = to'2 , that is, Var(YI) =(J2 while 
j=1 
Var(Y2) = 2(J2. The variance of the series diverges to infinity with t . 
17 The latest version of Eviews for instance, Eview5 determines the nwnber of lags automatically 
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1987). The Phillips and Perron (PP) test will also be employed given its ability to correct the 
autocorrelations in the series by using nonparametric techniques 18(Kiymaz et al. 2006). 
3.3.2 Cointegration Tests 
If variables are non-stationary ill levels, a cointegration test is run to establish the long-run 
relationship among them, as some of the macroeconomic variables may be non-stationary 
individually but tend to become stationary in linear combination. 
Despite the existence of several cointegration tests, for instance; the ordinary least square (Engle 
and Granger, 1987), non linear least square (Stock, 1987), principal components (Stock and Watson, 
1988) and canonical correlations (Bossaerts, 1988), the maximum likelihood method of Johansen's 
has a number of desirable properties, including treatment of all test variables as endogenous variables 
which is suitable for multivariate models 19. In static models, the Engle and Granger method suffers 
omission of the short-run elements of the dynamic model and in estimating the long-run 
parameter fJ, the method pushes more complicated dynamic terms into the residual, leading to 
severe autocorrelation in the residual (Harris, 1995) especially in case of more than one 
co integrating relationships. Likewise, the Watson test is only relevant when testing for the 
residual £, in the absence of higher-order autocorrelation, a situation that is very common in 
time series. 
Given the multivariate model employed in this study, the Johansen procedure that uses the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) procedure, relying on the relationship between rank of a matrix and 
its characteristic roots (Eigen values) to estimate long-run relationships between non-stationary 
variables is ideal. The null hypothesis r =0 (there is, no co integration vectors) is tested. If 
accepted, the procedure stops since the variables are non-co integrated, but if r =0 is rejected, it 
18 The PP takes the form X _ a f3 X f3 (I _T /) where T is the number of observations and the error 
I - 1-'0 + I ,-1 + 2 /2 +).-J, 
J.i, is such that E(I-',) = 0 
19 The Johansen technique suffers as well some weakness as pointed out by Harris (1995). 
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is then possible to test the hypothesis that there is at most one cointegration vector. The test 
provides the maximal Eigenvalues as well as the Trace test statistics, which aid in determining 
the number of co integration vectors. The basic question the test intends to answer is whether 
there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables included in the model. 
For multivariate models, if variables are non-stationary but cointegrated (at most r s (n -1) 
cointegration equations), a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is estimated to explore the 
nature and determinants of the long-run equilibrium relationships. 
3.3.3 The Vector Error Correction Model 
The Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model is employed due to its ability to difference the data to 
achieve stationarity and use error correction term to re-introduce the long-run information lost 
through differencing (Fanchon and Wendel, 1992). The VEC model include error correction term 
(that is, the residual series of the co integration equation) to represent departures from the long­
run equilibrium relationship between the co integrated variables. 
The estimated VECM is a restricted VAR that has co integration restrictions built into 
specification, and is designed for use with non-stationary series that are known to be 
co integrated. Specification of the VECM restricts the long-run behaviour of the variables to 
converge to their co integrating relationships while allowing a wide range of short-run dynamics. 
The co integration term (that is, the error correction term) corrects gradually deviations from the 
long-run equilibrium through a series of partial short-run adjustments. The VECM to be 
estimated is of the form; 
p-I 
M, = afJ'X,_p +L1iM,-i + G(" ........... . .......... ... ... . .................... ........ .........(3.6) 

i ~ 1 
Where fJ is (n x r) matrix of co integrating vectors that qualify the long-run relationship between 
the variables in the system, and a is (n x r) matrix of equilibrium correction coefficients, the 
38 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
elements of which load deviations from the equilibrium {J'X'_k into !1X, for correction. The r i 
coefficients estimate the short-run effect of shocks on!1X, . 
3.3.4 Impulse Response Functions 
The fiscal response of different variables usmg Impulse Response Functions (lRFs) is 
investigated following the Osei et al. (2005) approach. The IRFs graphs are used to show the 
response of budgetary allocation on priority social sectors and social indicators over-time to a 
one-time shock in input variables. In particular, we use the orthogonalized IRFs that allow 
analysis of how a change in debt relief, holding everything else constant, affects government 
expenditure after some period. A Cholesky decomposition approach proposed by Sims (1980) 
will be employed to calculate the IRFs. The impulse response analysis uses the moving average 
representation integrated of order one {/(l)} , that is; 
00 
Y, =£, + AI£t-l + A 2£,-2 + ... + LAiqJX'_i·········· .. .... ... . .... ... ... .... ...... ..... .... .. .. .... .. . .... .. (3 .7) 

i=O 
Where the (m x m) coefficient matrices Ai can be obtained according to 
Ai =rAAi-1 + rAAi-2 + ... + ¢pAi_P·········· .......... .............. .... ......... ... ...... ... . .. .... ......... (3.8) 
With Ao = / m and Ai = 0 for i < 0 
Analysis of Impulse Response attempts to describe the dynamic properties of the model 
following certain shocks. Essentially it traces out the moving average representation of the 
system and describes how variables of interest (endogenous) respond over time to a one-time 
shock to one of the innovations. Sims (l980a) noted that, examining the IRFs might be the most 
effective way of checking for Granger non-causality in multivariate frameworks. 
In the first place; debt relief, international official transfers, domestic revenue and institutional 
quality are shocked to assess the responses on the government expenditure on education and 
health. It is expected that social services spending would respond positively over time to the 
shocks. In a second simulation, an assessment is done on how both primary and secondary 
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school enrolments and life expectancy respond over to a one time shock on government 
on education, health and shocking is expected to generate 
over time on both primary school enrolments and life 
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Spending4.0 The Impact of Debt .........<Ju...". on Education and 

pctirrl<.tp" and impacts public to show how 
model presented in the n,.""'",,,,11 chapter. As a on education and health 
time series based tests are done on the ",",..-,1'" and cointegration 
by estimation of Vector ·",....,""h.'n Model (VECM), 
functions, correlations and covariance and robustness check. Policy implications are 
drawn on the findings. 
revealed 4.1) that, all variables were non-stationary at 
we reject the null (i.e. Ho : fJ :;;;; 0). After 
n.",,,.... vUi>,, (IR) 
Tests 
The 
stationary even at 99 cent confidence interval was 
no PTe"'TP'" in the data, only a constant is in the tests. Graphical 
variables at and after first differencing are included in Appendices I II, 1'",,,r'PI't 
Thus, due to presence of unit root, we prc)ce1eoe:o to test for long-run equilibrium 
relationship g"""",THY variables using the method. 
In collinear variables I error and consequently 
results. Hnu'...·"..... Y oav Ganzach (1998), ""'1'1""''','''' and Jones (1983), 
Humphreys (1990) Cortina 1993) suggested that, co \linearity is severe a 
linear model estimated in the presence of both between independent 
and curvilinear, particularly quadratic, relationship hpt·,"P"t'l InIOelDenlOelrlt variables and OelJenlOeJrlt 
variable. Shepperd (1991) further stated that when interaction, but no 
relationships, terms should not estimation. Since is no 
theoretical base n""'\X,p,'n the study, the quadratic terms 
were not of the collinearity variables was not t>v,'\",,,tpr! 
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Table 4-1: Stationarity Tests of Fiscal Spending Variables 
Variable ADF pp 
Name Variable Description ~/(O) ~ /(1) ~ /(0) ~ /(1) 
LDREV 
LEDUC 
LEXDB 
LEXDR 
LEXDS 
LI-IEAL 
LINOT 
LINST 
I, LDRINST 
Log ofdomestic revenue 
Log of education expenditure 
Log ofexternal debt stock 
Log of external debt relief 
Log ofexternal debt service 
-
Log of health expenditure 
~ 
Log of international official transfers 
-
Log of institutional quality 
Log of(EXDR*INST) 
-0.29 
-0.10 
-1.12 
-0.58 
-2.11 
0.08 
-1.41 
-0.07 
-0.47 
-5.29*** 
-2.40* 
-8.33*** 
-7.27*** 
-3.89*** 
-5.93*** 
-14.42*** 
-6.24*** 
-8.62*** 
-0.31 
-0.07 
-2.96 
-1.09 
-2.20 
0.08 
-1.35 
0.03 
-1.48 
-5 .39*** 
-6.10*** 
-7 54*** ~ 
-9:89*** ~ 
-3 95*** ~ 
• 
-5.93*** 
-12.86*** 
-6.25*** 
-11.49*** 
! 
Note: •••• ". • denotes rejectIon of the null hypotheSIS ofnon-stahonanty at 1%,5% and 10% slgnoficance level. respectIvely. 
4.2 Cointegration Test Results 
The cointegration test (see Table 4.2) of the variables in log fonn revealed presence of up to 5 
and 3 cointegration equations based on Trace Test and Maximum-Eigenvalues, respectively. The 
null hypothesis of non-co integration is therefore rejected. Consistent with theoretical 
expectations, three cointegrating equations are considered in for estimation20. 
Table 4-2: Cointegration Results for Government Expenditure Variables 
Hypotheses Trace Test Max-Eigenvalue Test 
Ho HA Statistic 5%C.V. Statistic 5% C. V. 
~ 
r-
r=O 
r~1 
-r~2 
-
r~3 
r~4 
r=l 
-
r=2 
-
r=3 
- -
r=4 
r=5 
1-
351.50* 
241.62* 
172.28* 
114.34* 
74.82* 
197.37 
159.53 
1-
125.62 
95.75 
69.82 
-
, ~ 
- 1-
109.88* 
69.34* 
-
57.94* 
-39.52 
31.52 
58.43 
52.36
-
46.23
- 40.08 
33.88 
Note: Trace and Max-EIgenvalue tests mdlcate 5 and 3 comtegratmg equatIOns (*) respectIvely at 5% level. 
20 For more literature on contradicting results between Trace and Max-Eigenvalues statistics, see Johansen (1995), 
and Fedderke and Romm (2004). 
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4.3 Analysis of the Long-run Relationship 
The long-run equations in Table 4.3 suggest positive elasticity of Government expenditure on 
education (LEDUC) with respect to health spending (LHEAL), international official transfers 
(LINOT) and interaction between debt relief and institutional quality (LDRINIST) while 
negative with external debt balance (LEXDB), the relationships that are consistent to theoretical 
and empirical literature. Contrary to expectations, government spending on education seems to 
decrease with domestic revenue (LDREV) and debt relief (LEXDR) and increases with external 
debt service (LEXDS). However, government expenditure on health (LHEAL) increases with 
domestic revenue but decreases with debt relief, external debt balance, international official 
transfers and institutional quality (LINST). Moreover, LDREV is found to increase with all 
variables except the interaction of debt relief and institutional quality. Institutional quality is not 
significant in explaining LEDUC in the long-run. The divergence of the fmdings from expected 
theoretical long-run relationships are likely to be attributable to poor quality of data and 
relatively shortness of the series used, particularly debt relief in the estimation. 
Table 4-3: The Cointegration Equations on Government Spending 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Variables Eq2(LHEAL) Eq3 (LDREV) Eq2(LHEAL)Eql(LEDUC) Eql(LEDUC) Eql(LEDUC) 
LEDUC 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000I I 
0.7174*LHEAL 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
-
LDREV 1 -0.3218* 6.4577* 9.4505* 0.0000 0.0000 1 1.0000 1 
-
-1.0931 * -0.5988*LEXDR -0.6339* -1.6899* -1.4721* 0.0924 
-
-0.4955* 0.3381* 'LEXDB -0.3783* -3.0259* -3.6907* -0.8426* I1 1 
LINOT 0.4005* 
~ 
-1.8746* 
~ 
-3.1715* 1.0244* 1.0710* 0.4489*
- 1- ­ -LEXDS 0.3752* 0.4470* 
- 1- ­ -
LINST -9.7476* -13.5719* 1.3997* 
LDRINST 0.5237* 2.6965* 1.0291* 0.5886* -0.2582*3.0289* I 
Note: * denotes 5% slgmficance level 
Thus, due to the presence of the co integration vectors among the variables, a Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) is estimated instead of the unrestricted Vector Autoregression (V AR) 
model to establish the short-run relationships. 
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4.4 VECM Estimation and Analysis of Short-run Relationship 
Interpretation ofVECM results need caution as coefficient estimates and their standard errors are 
of little relevance for two main reasons; fIrstly, a highly parameterized model and/or with limited 
data set erodes the degree of freedom which makes the coefficient estimates uninformative, and 
secondly, near collinearity of the regressors arising from a highly parameterized model may lead 
to very imprecise estimates of the short-run relationship (Canova 1995). It is therefore, the signs 
of coefficient estimates that deserve close attention in the analysis. Caution is also taken to avoid 
loss of degree of freedom due to over-parameterized21 model while maintaining optimal use of 
relevant information. Thus, on the basis of diagnostic tests based on the number of observations, 
a VEC model of one lag is chosen for estimation in this study. All variables are transformed into 
log form to smooth out breaks and sharp fluctuations. 
The VEC model is estimated using the identifIed cointegration relations arriving at the results 
presented in Table 4.4 (Annex III shows full version of results). The table-heading column 
indicates the dependent variables in each of the model equations, while the row headings indicate 
the conditioning variables. Since our interest is on the impact of debt relief on fiscal allocation to 
education and health expenditure, concentration is on the second and third columns (EDUC and 
HEAL) against the rows for debt relief (EXDR), institutional quality and the variable 
representing interaction of the two (DRINST). 
As expected, government spending in education and health increases with debt relief, the results 
that echo the fmdings by Cassimon and Campenhout (2007). The institutional quality revealed to 
contribute positively to expenditure on education and health though not signifIcant with the later. 
This may be justified by time lag between improvement in institutions and increase in 
government spending, especially in a one lag VECM specification. The fmdings, further suggest 
for a signifIcant autoregressive effect in education, that is, there is likeliness that spending in one 
21 Moderately sized models become highly over-parameterized relative to the number of observations, leading to 
insignificant or inefficient estimates of short-r\.U1 parameters while too short lags also produce statistical models, 
where only a subset of relevant information is used to characterize the data and leaves serial correlation in error 
terms, which may induce spurious significance and inefficient estimates. 
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year lead to higher spending in the subsequent years. The fmdings, however, do not hold on 
health spending. 
Contrary to theoretical expectations, government spending on education has a significant 
negative elasticity with respect to domestic revenue. On the other hand, fiscal spending on health 
has a positive elasticity coefficient though insignificant with respect to domestic revenue. The 
fmdings suggest that education and health spending are determined by factors other than 
domestic revenue which may be justified by a 40 per cent on average of annual budget being 
externally fmanced. International official transfers (INOT) and external debt balance (EXDB) 
were not significant in determining government spending on the two sectors, with possible 
explanation being the quality of data used, particularly the INOT that were based on donor 
commitments and not actual disbursements. In the same line, the fmdings by McGillivray and 
Ouattara (2003) established that the bulk of aid is allocated to debt servicing and that aid is 
associated with increases in the level of public debt. The DRINST was not found to influence 
EDUC and HEAL which diverges from the fmdings by Dessy and Vencatachellum (2007) as 
well as from theoretical expectations. 
Table 4-4: VECM for Impact ofEXDR on EDUC and HEAL 
-0.2846 0.1466 -0.0810 2.4977D(LEXDS(-I» 0.6555 1.7697 
[-0.7562] [ 2.6070) [-1.1839) [3.5425) [ 2.5535) [ 0.6883) 
-
-6.8841 -10.33021.9801 0.2268 0.0841 0.0098D(LINST(-I» 
D(LHEAL) D(LEXDR) D(LEXDS) D(LINST) D(LDRINST)Error Correction , D(LEDUC) 
0.0324 2.5741 -0.1464 0.1066 3.3630IID(LEDUC(-I» 0.7288 
[ 2.6763) [2.3112) [ 2.8320) [-0.5243) [0.7588)[0.13331~ I 
-0.1219 -2.0623 0.1685 0.0664 -2.7695-0.4865D(LHEAL(-I» 
[-1.8469)[-1.2929) [-0.4207) [-1.9012) [0.5054) [0.3958) 
r-" 0.4786 
-0.0326 -1.06450.4451 -0.6875 -0.1162D(LEXDR(-I» 
[2.0193) [-1.0063) [-0.1552) [-1.1006) [-I.l271)[2.4401)
-
~ 
[ 0.0298] [2.6894) [0.4001) [-3.2437) [ 0.l289) [-3.5209) 
-0.4543 -0.3235 0.7045 -0.0838 0.0735 1.1240D(LDRINST( -I» 
~ 
[-2.7149) [-2.5119) [ 1.4604) [-0.5655) [0.9853) [ 1.6855) 
t-statistic in brackets 
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elasticity of debt with to external debt balance and "pr.,1r'p has 
U""'EWlH'-'<UU negative ill priori expectations, Despite the elasticity of domestic 
revenue with respect to debt taking the expected positive coefficient is not 
significant suggesting a further elasticity between 
debt relief (EXDR) and international official transfers (INOT) which is to the expected 
complementarity relationship. may be some donors 
committed debt relief as a to general or budget and1 H"'U,,- I;:) 
Nissanke (1984) found that, end of cold war had witnessed a in the official 
bilateral assistance mostly due to the less importance of politically motivated transfers, the 
period that coincided with launch of various debt relief initiatives. 
4.5 Impulse Ke:sO()ns:e Government Expenditure on Services 
In investigating the reSDOltlSe on and health, innovations are 
generated on !NOT, !NST Response Functions 
(IRFs) of each of shocks is computed using the (with adjusted 
degree of freedom) on the estintlates from the of government eX1JeriOit 
on education and health are illustrated in Figure 4-1. 
Panel (a) associated with government on education. Illustration is 
on of education spending to a one standard deviation shock on 
debt rlr","p(,t", revenue, international and institutional quality. the 
figure shows, a on EXDR increases continuously to a maximum of 14.6 per cent in 
the sixth declining to about 10 tenth year, the level that 
constant A shock on DREV that fluctuate in the 
years with a impact of 2.5 per cent in year only. The shock 
negative 3 cent starting in the expenditure on 
sharply with a shock on INOT to a negative 7.6 per cent in after 
which at around negative 3 on INST seems to by per 
cent in before declining '''''HU'E constant below negative 3 cent. 
to ",v,·",t"'Y." 
m ,ll rm
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per cent (b) shows that a shock in 
sixth year, thereafter decline and remain constant at cent. A shock 
increases health "IJ'-,"Ulll~ then declines and per cent 
at around zero \!prnm,pnT spending on health seems to decline with a 
on INOT and INST. 
4-1 Impulse Response for Government Spending in Social ~·,it>lt'V1,,,,.,.,, 
(a) Response of LEDUC to Cholesky (b) Response of LHEAL to Cholesky 
One S.D. Innovations One S.D. Innovations 
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4.6 Correlation and Covariance matrix 
in the previous ,""'''''V,LA,Despite 
over-parameterization 
...,"luual" l1P'opr·u.... " attention. As Table fonn 
the VECM may 
so the covariance of 
little 
the covariance matrix of the reduced 
form is on the upper triangular (highlighted) and on the lower triangular are 
patterns of correlation are worth emphasizing though with a caution as 
reflect only. 
The correlation shows that, debt relief is with the 
expenditure on and health, which is in In line with 
fiscal theories, o""p,-n expenditure on education to improve with 
domestic revenue. borrowing, all variables 
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were found to be positively correlated with institutional quality. However, external debt service 
is positively correlated to all other variables which is contrary to theoretical expectations. The 
interacted variables behaved according to prior expectations. 
Table 4-5 Government Expenditure Covariance and Correlation Matrix 
LEDUC LHEAL LEXDR LINST LDREV LEXDB LINOT LDRINST LEXDS 
LEDUC 5.51 4.70 3.91 0.69 4.24 4.40 4.61 4.69 4.43 
LHEAL 0.99 4.97 4.14 0.70 4.50 4.70 4.93 4.91 4.73 
LEXDR 0.90 0.90 4.24 0.60 3.84 4.08 4.30 5.01 4.19 
LINST 0.92 0.89 0.82 0.12 0.62 0.61 0.65 0.76 0.59 
LDREV 0.97 0.98 0.91 0.86 4.21 4.48 4.60 4.47 4.61 
LEXDB 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.77 0.98 5.00 5.00 4.63 5.22 
LINOT 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.80 0.98 0.97 5.28 4.94 5.14 
LDRINST 0.89 0.89 0.98 0.87 0.88 0.83 0.86 6.16 4.66 
LEXDS 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.70 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.79 5.61 
4.7 Robustness of the Estimation 
To check for the robustness of the results, estimation is done using debt relief data in nominal 
terms obtained from Bank of Tanzania publications instead of NPV terms used in the previous 
section. The use of NPV was meant to capture impact debt cancellation ignoring intertemporal 
effects of rescheduling. The series was normalized as a ratio of GDP and the variable became 
stationary after first differencing. The results (attached as Appendix IV) indicated debt relief had 
the expected positive sign though not significant on influencing government expenditure on 
education and health. The insignificance might be attributable to the fact that, nominal debt relief 
figures do not capture the effects of debt rescheduling, and as such understate the impact of debt 
relief initiatives. Interaction of nominal debt relief with institutional quality had a negative effect 
on government spending on education and health as was with the NPV figures. 
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4.8 Policy Implications 
It is evident 
expenditure on 
suggest 
education and 
international 
the increased 
policy 
enhance 
internatio nal 
that enhance 
involved no external 
findings that the granted to Tanzania government 
priority sectors, education and health. findings 
quality to play an role in increasing public to 
sectors. Contrary to debt relief is to substitute 
transfers. The '~H~~'I~V sense that; 
to the .......,"...1·., sectors need to be fiscal 
implementation with institutional reforms to 
debt relief. Moreover, debt relief seems to other 
the debt relief need to formulate 
revenue sources by taking into account the fact that both MDRl 
of fresh resources. 
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5.0 The Impact of Fiscal Spending on Social Indicators 
In this chapter we estimate and interpret results of the impact of education and health public 
spending on primary and secondary school enrolments as well as on life expectancy. The 
stationarity and cointegration tests are conducted, followed by estimation of VEe Model, IRFs, 
correlations and covariance matrices, and robustness check. Eventually, policy recommendations 
are drawn based on the fIndings. 
5.1 Stationarity Tests 
The stationarity test results presented in Table 5-1 revealed that all variables were not stationary 
at levels . However, after differencing ( -1(1) ), the rest of the series became stationary at 99 per 
cent confIdence interval, except life expectancy (LFXP) that was signifIcant at 90 per cent. 
Graphical illustrations of the variables at levels and after first differencing are included in 
Appendices I and II, respectively. 
Table 5-1: Stationarity Test of the Social Indicators Variables 
Variable Variable Description ADF PP 
Name 
-1(0) -1(1) - 1(0) -1(1) 
LEDUC 
LHEAL 
LINST 
LLFXP 
LPRENII 
LSCEN 
Log of education expenditure 
Log of health expenditure 
-
Log of institutional quality 
Log of life expectancy 
Log of primary school enrolment 
Log of secondary school enrolment 
-0.10 
0.08 
-0.07 
-1.58 
-1.57 
-1.02 
-2.40* 
-5 .93*** 
-6.24*** 
-2.87* 
-2.40*** 
-5.45*** 
-0.07 
0.08 
0.03 
0.03 
-2.07 
0.94 
-6.10*** 
-5.93*** 
-6.25*** 
-2.72* 
-2.40*** 
-5.52*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes rejectIOn of the null hypotheSIS of non-statIOnanty at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. /I LPREN is tested in levels and flIst difference without constant. 
5.2 Cointegration Test Results 
Table 5-2(a) presents the cointegration results on the variables incorporated in estimating the 
impact of fiscal allocation on education improvement as proxied by primary and secondary 
school enrolments, and on health improvements using life expectancy as an indicator. The 
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incorporated variables in log form; PREN, SCEN, LFXP, HEAL, EDUC, and INST showed 
presence of at most 2 co integrating equations based on both Trace test and Maximum-Eigen 
values at 5 per cent level. In all the co integration tests, the t-statistic from the Trace test and 
Maximal-Eigen values statistics support the rejection of the null hypothesis that r = 0 at 95 per 
cent confidence interval. 
Table 5-2 Cointegration Results for Social Indicators Variables 
Hypotheses Trace Test Max-Eigenvalue Test 
Ho HA Statistic 5% C. V. Statistic 5% C. V. 
r=O 
r ~ 1 
r=1 
r=2 
133.3183 
81.47954 
95.75366 
69.81889 
51.83873 
43.96754 
40.07757 
33.87687 
Note: Both Trace and Max-eigenvalue tests mdlcate 2 comtegratmg equallons at 5% level. 
5.3 Analysis ofthe Long-Run Relationship 
As presented in Table 5-3, PREN increases with SCEN in the long-run due to greater possibility 
of primary school leavers getting opportunities to proceed to school education. As expected, 
improvements in LFXP by one unit increases PREN and SCEN by 29 units and 6 units 
respectively, the relationship is likely to emanate from the fall in child mortality rates. Likewise, 
the elasticity of PREN with respect to HEAL and education is positive, suggesting that in the 
long-run social indicators improve with more resources allocations. Moreover, INST is 
significant in determining PREN. The long-run relationships, however, suggest that the elasticity 
of secondary school enrolment with respect to EDUC and INST are negative, which is contrary 
to theoretical expectations. 
Table 5-3 Long-Run Equations on Social Indicators 
Variables Case 1(LPREN) Case 2 
E n 1 (LPREN) E n 2 (LSCEN) 
I LPREN 
LSCEN 
I LLFXP 
LHEAL 
LEDUC 
1.0000 
4.8774* 
29.3904* 
2.0396* 
0.2507* 
1.0000 
0.0000 
0.3557* 
0.0000 
1.0000 
6.2846* 
0.4911 * 
-0.0573* 
LINST 
I 
5.1280* -2.0962* -1.4812* 
Note: • denotes significance at 5% level 
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5.4 VECM Estimation and Analysis of Short-run Relationships 
the social to reSiOOflO toThough theory would ~""''''V~ 
in education and health, a of two lags is optimal for our to the small number 
of observations, particularly 
are supported by diagnostic 
that started mid I 2 m estimation 
UJnJU'IS" 
The fmdings as suggest significant increase 
sec:onaar'v school enrollment in EDUC in the fl1'st 
by Jubilee USA Network (2007) that, on average, Tanzania 
to increase education "1J",uU.UIF; realization of the HIPC debt 
m both primary and 
support 
million a 
school 
at primary level were consequently registration of about 1.6 children 
into primary schools. 
in the institutional was to contribute significantly to and 
schoo	I enro llments results further in 
enrolment in expenditure in health in 
attributable to prevention treatment of common diseases fall 
m mortality. All these results are in with theoretical expectations. 
government expenditure in health was not significant and worse negatively to 
expectancy. Institutional quality was not ""hUlA:'"...". in explaining life \;;AIJ\;;,,·"Ul\;; 
mS:lgnltIc:an(~e can partly be attributable to of model and 
that life including HIV/ AIDS diseases. 
22 Full set of results is presented in Appendix V. 
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Table 5-4 VECM Results for Social Services Indicators 
Error Correction I D(LPREN) D(LSCEN) D(LLFXP) D(LEDUC) ,I. D(LHEAL) D(LINST) 
D(LPREN(-l) 0.4634 -0.5178 0.03497 8.0817 0.4900 0.2276 
[ 2.3555] [-1.9796] [ 0.6094] [ 1.3215] [ 0.4922] [ 0.4211) 
D(LPREN(-I» 0.1758 -0.0957 -0.0298 -8.2518 0.2403 -0.3208 
[0.9344] [-0.3825] [-0.5437] [-1.4113] [0.2525] [-0.6208] 
D(LSCEN(-l» 0.5705 1.I254 0.0409 -10.936 -1.3754 -0.2675 
[ 2.6365] [3.9124] [0.6478] [-1.6261] [-1.2563] [-0.4500] 
D(LSCEN(-2» 0.4924 1.0374 0.0261 7.6252 0.3047 -0.7089 
[ 2.8421] [4.5039] [ 0.5163] [ 1.4158] [ 0.3476] [-1.4895] 
D(LLFXP (-I» 2.1639 3.2277 0.0458 -7.6623 -3.5422 0.5452 
[ 2.1503] [l.4127] [0.1560] [-0.249] [-0.6956] [0.1972] 
D(LLFXP (-2» 0.3 109 -0.9247 -0.0222 117.8966 0.1027 -1.4430 
[ 0.3594] [-0.8039] [-0.0880] [4.3834] [ 0.0235] [-0.6071] 
D(LEDUC (-I» 0.0232 0.0360 0.0010 0.3871 0.0278 -0.0041 
[ 3.2972] [3.8537] [ 0.4821] [ 1.7705] [ 0.7802] [-0.2146] 
D(LEDUC (-2» -0.0080 -0.0075 -2 .09E-06 -0.1139 0.0043 -0.0256 
[-1.4211] [-1.0057] [-0.00J3] [-0.6552] [ 0.l477] [-1.6674] 
D(LHEAL (-1» 0.0468 -0.0538 -0.0183 -0.7741 -0.4139 0.2474 
[ 0.989] [-0.8559] [-1.3264] [-0.5267] [-1 .7300] [1.9049] 
D(LHEAL (-2» 0.0913 -0.0015 -0.0106 2.4233 -0 .1264 0.1110 
[ 2.0850] [-0.0252] [-0.8295] [ I. 7803] [-0.5703] [0.9229] 
I D(LINST(-I» 0.5682 0.7793 0.0283 -12.9600 -1.7280 0.1430 
[ 3.2739] [3.3780] [ 0.5597] [-2.4024] [-J.9678] [0.2999] 
D(LINST(-2» 0.3855 0.8449 0.0132 -4.0681 -0.8493 -0.1901 
[ 26831] [ 4.4231] [0.3152] [-0.9108] [-1.1681] [-0.4817] 
..t- statistics In brackets 
5.5 Impulse Response of Social Indictors 
The impulse response of social indicators with respect to innovations on government expenditure 
and institutional quality are depicted in Figure 5-1. Panel (a) shows that a shock on government 
expenditure on education increases moderately primary school enrolment to a maximum of3 per 
cent in the seventh year after which declines and remain constant above 2 per cent. The response 
functions further suggest that a shock on institutional quality increases primary school 
enrollment moderately over time whereas, a shock on public health spending seems to increase 
significantly primary school enrolment with time. 
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5-1: Impulse for Social Services Indicators 
(a) Response of lFflEN to Cholesky (b) Response of lSCEN to Cholesky (c) Response of LlFXP 10 Cholesky 
One S.D. I1novalions One S.D. Innovations Ooe S.D. I1novalions 
20-r----------......, -r-----------.,~r_-----------_, 
.16 
12 
.08 
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Panel (b) shows innovation on mcreases in fourth year recording a 
maximum of 6.6 cent in year, after which UI"."H~.U"," to below 4 per cent 
in the twentieth uJlV,,"'''' on INST and EDUe to 1 per cent 
after which worsens in the fourth year onwards in the seventh 
The response of as presented in panel ( c) that a shock in health 
lengthens life throughout the considered twenty Shocks on education spending 
and institutional seems to shorten life expectancy recording minima in the tenth year 
though to zero in out years. 
5.6 Correlation and Covariance matrix 
The correlation presented in Table 5.5 with matrix of the 
residuals on triangular (highlighted) and on lower triangular su~~ge;sts 
that, expenditure on education on own and when interacted with 
quality is correlated with primary and school enrolment. Life ..."~,,,,,,al.'''' 
expenditure on health, though when interacted with institutional quality life 
the fmdings that support those of the previous section. With an 
exception expectancy, all other are found to be positively correlated with 
institutional quality. 
f
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Table 5-5 Social Indicators Covariance and Correlation Matrix 
LEDUC LHEAL LPREN LSCEN LLFXP LINST LDCINST LHEINST 
LEDUC 4.5069 4.6961 0.1589 0.6508 0.0102 0.6905 5.7079 5.5243 
LHEAL 0.9919 4.9731 0.1695 0.6960 0.0164 0.7020 5.9029 5.8211 
LEXDR 0.3263 0.3313 0.0526 0.0148 0.0084 0.0092 0.1666 0.1734 
LINST 0.9394 0.9565 0.1970 0.1065 0.0026 0.0973 0.8062 0.8016 
LDREV 0.0756 0.1151 0.5769 0.1265 0.0041 -0.0052 -0.0144 -0.0080 
LEXDB 0.9202 0.8907 0.1135 0.8436 -0.2292 0.1249 0.9206 0.8662 
LINOT 0.9850 0.9697 0.2661 0.9051 -0.0826 0.9541 7.4515 7.1627 
LDRINST 0.9807 0.9837 0.2848 0.9258 -0.0470 0.9235 0.9889 7.0412 
5.7 Robustness of the Estimation 
Checking for robustness of the fmdings presented in the previous sections, we use infant 
mortality rate23 (INFM) estimated by UNICEF as health improvement indicator instead of life 
expectancy and of primary-to-secondary education transition (PTRN) and transition in secondary 
education24 (STRN) in position of gross enrolments rates. The series became stationary after flrst 
differencing and two co integrating equations were established. The results (Appendix VI) 
showed that government expenditure on education had the expected signs and signiflcant in 
improving primary-to-secondary in flrst year but not signiflcant in the second year. Likewise, 
education spending improves transition within secondary education though not signiflcant. 
Expenditure on health improves insigniflcantly primary-to-secondary transition, but deteriorates 
infant mortality rates, the results that echo those of the previous sections. The abnormality of the 
fmdings may be attributable to the quality of data. Institutional quality improves transition in 
both primary-to-secondary and within secondary education. Thus, from the robustness check, it 
is clear that, budgetary allocation to education improves educational indicators irrespective of the 
measure used. 
23 In fant mortality rate (INFM) used in this estimation refers to number of deaths out of 1000 for children under five 

years of age. 

24 Secondary education transition (STRN) refers to the proportion of pupils selected to join Form Five after 

completing successfully Form Four. 
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Policy Implications 
results if hold, implies that, attainment of MDGs requires 
priority sectors. Since gross primary and secondary 
to education expenditure, the desire to 
as envisaged in the Vision 2015, are 
to education. The fmdings also 
hence by implication poor 
enrollments, ceteris paribus. The Government can as 
through allocation to the health sector. 
course of attaining the MDGs. 
public expenditure on 
rates responded 
100 cent 
Government maintains 
enrollments to improve with 
and secondary school 
school enrollment rates 
HHJVAU.U reforms remain vital in 
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6.0 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
6.1 Summary and conclusion of the study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of debt relief on fiscal allocation and the 
response of the social indicators in the HIPCs using Tanzania as a case study. Specifically, the 
study investigated how debt relief impacted fiscal allocation on education and health sectors. 
Extension was done to examine how increased funding in education and health translated into 
primary and secondary school enrolments as well as into life expectancy. 
Based on the estimations and the consequent analysis of the fmdings on how debt relief alters 
fiscal allocation to education and health and ultimately the response of primary and secondary 
school enrolment, and life expectancy to public spending on education and health, respectively, 
the following conclusions emerge: 
(i) 	 Debt relief is one of the effective ways of increasing government expenditure on social 
priority sectors. 
(ii) 	 Increases in fiscal allocation to education and health improve both primary and secondary 
school enrolments. 
(iii) 	 Institutional quality plays a signif cant role in determining fiscal allocation to education 
and to primary and secondary school enrollments, though not with respect to health or 
life expectancy. 
(iv) 	 The results, however, do not support the expectation that increase in heath improves life 
expectancy probably due to longer gestation period inherent with the latter. 
As indicated in the objectives of the study, the findings give a promising insight that debt relief 
savings increase social spending in the HIPCs as fmdings suggested in the case of Tanzanian. 
Likewise, there is a greater possibility that increased public spending on social services improves 
social indicators. If the results hold, a conclusion can be drawn that, with quality institutions, the 
use of debt relief savings contribute towards faster attainment of MDGs in the HIPCs. 
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6.2 Policy recommendations 
At the outset, debt is not a as long as the borrowed are used in and 
economically productive and programs that up poverty. second 
place, debt should sustainable in as a way does not rip,·....",'" 
important of the study is relief is not an end in 
Though relief is advocated increased spending in social priority sectors and ultimately 
contributes to poverty reduction of the relief depends very much on the 
Government's commitment to channel and ensure that resources reach the 
identified poverty related sectors a on education and health. 
The channeling and tracking the debt to achieve desired 
in institutional quality specifically governance, accountability and 
Both and literature shows the of institutional 
quality and improvement necessary infrastructure the to contribute 
effectively in development and ultimately attainment of 
the goals debt relief depends countries' 
to track poverty-reducing expenditure in acc rdance each country's poverty reduction 
strategy mostly bound to be country specific et a!., 2002). 
debt in nature as as there are no policy rt"""t"'n,,,,are 
that facilitated reaching and completion 
of MDRl vital. In as much, debt points under 
to prudent domestic macrClec()no 
ill against Debt is one many causes of wide 
The should not use the space by debt relief to contract 
more new Otherwise, the Governments will be practicing a moral hazard identified in both 
theoretical and empirical literature to undermine effects of debt relief. The consequence of 
the hazard is reverting back to unsustainable debt and hence continuation of the debt 
poverty-trap. 
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6.3 Limitations of the study and areas for further research 
Although the greater part of the fmdings conforms to theoretical expectations, the observed 
divergences and suggestions that can be drawn from the fmdings need to be taken with care due 
to the limitations inherent in the estimations made. The study considered only education and 
health using secondary data while poverty related sectors identified in the PRSP are diverse, of 
which including all of them in the model, could have changed the fmdings . Likewise, gross 
primary and secondary school enrollments were considered to represent improvements in the 
education sector, whilst factors like quality of services were not covered. Enrollments may not 
necessarily signify improvements in the education, given the fact some of the new opened 
primary and secondary schools lack (qualified) teachers and basic teaching facilities such as 
desks and books. 
Secondly, debt relief initiatives especially under the frameworks of HIPC and MDRI are new 
and their impacts on social indicators are long-run. The insignificance of debt relief on the 
estimation of health spending and life expectancy can be attributed to the relatively short length 
of the series used in the model used. Thirdly, the data used in the study were drawn from 
different sources that would likely compromise the quality of data and the fmdings. For instance, 
the insignificance of international official transfers in determining government spending on 
education and health can be attributable to the use of donor data which reflect commitment rather 
than actual disbursements. 
Research in this area can therefore be stretched to include the omitted variables linked to poverty 
reduction as identified and included in the PRSP. In assessing the response of social indicators, 
collection of quality primary data through household surveys could improve the fmdings. 
Furthermore, debt relief under HIPC and MDRI is new and treats debts that were supposed to be 
serviced for up to fifty years, and for which cancellations may not be felt immediately in fiscal 
allocations. Social indicators on the other hand respond to fiscal allocation with time lag and the 
length of the lags depends on the infrastructure in place, governance and institutional quality. For 
sound conclusion, the impact of debt relief can be investigated thoroughly using long series. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Stationarity Graphs of the Variables at Levels 
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Appendix II: Stationarity Graphs of the Differenced Variables 
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Append'IX III : The VECM for Impact 0 f EXDR on EDUC and HEAL 
Error Correction D(lEDUC) D(LHEAL) D(LEXDR) D(LEXDB) D(lEXDS) D(LINOT) D(LINST) D(lDREV) D(LDRlNSi) 
Colnl Eqn J -0.7968 0.5223 1.0136 -0.2806 -0.1415 -0.4159 -0.0787 -0.1704 2.0323 
[-3.3355] [H411] [ 1.4720] [-1.6175] [-0.6688] [-2.0348] [-0.7397] [-1 .2085] [ 2./350] 
-
Coinl Eqnl 0.5940 -0.6587 -0.28112 0.0455 -0.2592 0.5373 0.1167 0.2221 -0.7793 
-­
[2.3509] [-3..1874] [-0.3861] [ 0.2476] [-1.1582] [ 2.4852] [ /.0369] [ 1.4892] [-0.7740] 
Coinl Eqru -0.5851 0.1155 0.9869 -0.3158 -0.3418 -0.2901 -0.0114 -0.05112 1.8964 
-
[-4.0600] [/.11413] [ 2.3757] [-3.0172] [-2.6774] [-2.3524] [-0.1775] [-0.6009] [ 3.3022] 
D(LEDUq-l» 0.7288 0.0324 2.5741 0.3110 -0.1464 1.2288 0.1066 0.1337 3.3630 
-
[2.3112] [O.!333] [ 2.8320] [ 1.3579] [-0.5243] [ 4.5545] [0.7588] [0.7/85] {2.6763] 
D(LHEAL(-I» -0.4865 ·01219 -2.0623 -0.1813 0.1685 -1.7818 0.0664 -0.3038 -2.7695 
-
[-1.2929] [·0.4207] [-1.9012] [-0.6634] [ 0.5054] [-5.5342] [ 0.3958] [-1.3679] [-1.8469] 
D(LEXDR(-I» 0.4786 0.4451 -0.6875 -0.0412 -0.0326 -0.5363 -0.1162 0.0288 -1.0645 
-
[2.0193] [2.4401] [-1.0063] [-0.2395] [-0.1552] [-2.6449] [-1.1006] [ 0.2059] [-1.1271] 
D(LEXDB(-I» 0.4064 -0.1767 0.1661 -0.1411 -0.3857 -0.1348 0.0794 0.1032 -0.1875 
-
[1.6006] [-0.'1044] [ 0.2270] [-0.7655] [-1.7152] [-0.6208] [ 0.7019] [ 0.6888] [-0.1854] 
D(LEXDS(-I» -0.2846 0.6555 1.7697 0.1512 0.1466 1.7355 -0.0810 0.0771 2.4977 
-
[-1.1839] [3.5425] [ 2.5535] [ 0.8660] [ 0.6883] [ 8.4366] [-0.7562] [ 0.5434] [ 2.6070] 
D(L1NOT(-J» -0.0457 0.0997 0.2158 0.04633 0.0145 0.0002 -0.0158 0.0293 0.3424 
-
[-05693] [1.6137] [ 0.9322] [ 0.7945] [ 0.2033] [ 0.0031] [-0.4422] [ 0.6182] [ 1.0701] 
D(LINST(-I» 1.9801 0.2268 -6.8841 -0.3383 0.0841 -3.9962 0.0098 -0.2604 -10.3302 1 
[2.6894] [0.·1001] [ -3.2437] [-0.6328] [ 0.1289] [-6.3436] [ 0.0298] [-0.5992] [-3.5209] 
-
D(LDREV(-J» -0.8938 0.0367 1.0974 0.2299 0.6144 -0.1959 0.0707 0.0113 1.9498 
[-2.2855] [0.1219] [0.9735] [0.8096] [ 1.7736] {-0.5854] [ 0.4058] [0.0488] ( 1.2511] 
D(LDRlNST(-I» -0.4543 -0.3235 0.7045 -0.0251 -0.0838 0.4303 0.0735 0.0025 1.1240 
[-2.7149] [-2.5119] [ 1.4604] [-0.2070] [-0.5655] [ 3.0058] [ 0.9853] [ 0.0252] [ 1.6855] 
C 0.2270 0.0987 -0.3283 0.1020 0.1057 0.1413 -0.0171 0.1715 -0.4512 
[2.8791] [1.6266] [-1.44481 { 1.7819] { 1.5143] [2.09481 {-0.48601 { 3.6865] {-1.4362J 
Detenninant Resid Covariance (dof Adj) 0.0000 
Determinant Resid Covariance 0.0000 
Likelihood 246.5128 
Akaike Infonnation Criteria -5.6952 
Schwarz Criteria 0.6389 
I-SlatlStlc In brackels 
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IV R b .A~ppend'IX : 0 ustness Check on t h e Pu bl"IC Expend'lture on SoClaISectors 
Error Correction D(1EDUC) D(LHEAL) D(LEXDR) D(LEXDB) D(LEXDS) D(lINOn D(LlNST) D(lDREV) D(lDRINST) 
Coint Eqn 1 -0.3431 0.0976 -l.l811 0.0189 0.0199 0.0861 -0.0274 -0.0602 -1.4560 
[-I. 8904} [ 0.5587} [-2.0474} [ 0.1450} [ 0.2639} [ 0.5007} [-0.4042} [-0. 2605} [-2. 5326} 
D(LEDUq-I» 0.3444 0.2435 1.0678 -0.0108 0.0390 -0.2990 0.1012 -0.1446 1.2759 
[ 1.6438 [ 1.2078} [ 1.6035} [-0.07l5} [ OA473} [-1.5070] [ 1.29JJ} [-0.5417} [ 1.9226} 
D(LHEAL(-l» 0.0384 -0.0874 -0.7634 -0.0150 -0.0949 -0.0825 0.0447 0.3339 -1.0510 
[ 0.1536} [-0.3631} [-0. 9602} [-0.0836} [-0.9121} [-0. 3482} [ OA775} [ 1.0480} [-1.32M} 
D(LEXDR(-I» 0.2436 0.0266 1.4438 0.1256 -0.0490 0.3536 0.0973 -0.1128 1.60773 
[ 1.1163} [0.1269} , [ 2. 0820} [ 0.8006} [-0. 540 I} [1.7IJ2} [ J.J923} [-OA059} [ 2. 3262} 
D(LEXDB(-l» 0.2097 -0.3087 0.7952 0.2521 0.0616 -0.3340 0.0843 -1.1556 0.8466 
[ 0.8385} [-1.28311 f-[ I .OOO5} [IA022} [ 0.5919} [-IAI02} [ 0.9015} [-3. 6276} [ 1.0687} 
D(LEXDS(-I » -0.64-1 I 0.0521 I 3.0804 0.1959 -0.3582 0.8390 -0.1208 0.5823 3.0932 
[-1 .3426} [ 0. JJ34} [ 2.0298} [ 0.5709} [-1 .8033} [ J.8553} [-0. 6765} [ 0.9573} [ 2.0453} 
D(LINOT(-l» -0.1532 0.2585 -0.9594 0. 1982 -0. 1200 0.3617 -0.1191 0.8862 -0.8425 
[-0. 6792} [ 1. 1909} [-1.3382} [ 1.22U} [-1.2790} [ I. 693 I} [-IAI2I} [ J.0841} [-I. I 79 I} 
D(LINST(-I» 0.1653 0.2988 -2.8489 -0.5799 0.0507 -1.0133 -0.1915 -0.4288 -2.034551 
[ 0.2457} [ 0.4618} [-1.3326} [ . 1.1994} [0.1813} [-/.5908} [-0. 7612} [-0.5005} [-0. 95496} 
D(LDREV(-l)) 0.0118 0.0521 0.0646 0.1143 0.0052 0.1500 -0 .0325 -0.2104 0.1068 
[ 0.1447} [0.6625} [0.U89} [ 1.9475} [0.1520} [ 1.9390} [-1.0645} [-2.0226} [ OA128} 
D(LDRINST(-l)) -0.2834 -0.0081 -1.3574 -0.1215 0.0120 -0.2627 -0.0867 0.1282 -1.5213 
[-1.J906} [-0.0412} [-2.0959} [-0. 8294} [0.1418} [-1.J616} [-I. J379} [ 0.4939} [-2. 35706} 
C -0.0094 0'('254 0.0804 -0.0004 0.0098 0.0115 0.0220 0.0112 0.0584 
[-0. 20 J5} [0.5655} [ 0.54237 f-0.OlJ5J [ 0.50407 LO.2605} [ 1.2639} LO.1889} UJJ953] 
Determinant Resid Covariance (dof Adj) 0.0000 
Determinant Resid Covariance 0.0000 
Likelihood 169.8453 
Akaike Information Criteria -3.4359 
Schwarz Critetia 1.3147 
I-SlaIlSIIC In brackels 
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A,ppend"IX V: VECM Resu]ts ~or SoCla"] Servlces ]nd"Icat ors 
Error Correction D(LPREN) D(LSCEN) D(LLFXP) D(LEDUC) D(LHEAL) D(LINST) 
Coint Eqn 1 0.1471 0.2189 0.0009 1.5525 -0.6296 -0.0172 
~ 
[ 3.0508] [ 3.4150] [ 0.0650] [ 1.0356] [-2.5800] [-0.1298] 
Coint Eqn2 -0.4283 -0.6998 -0.0245 0.4745 1.8126 0.0707 
-
[-3.2292] [-3.9689] [-0.6325] [ 0.JJ51] [ 2.7008] [0.1940] 
D(LPREN(-I» 0.4634 -0.5178 0.03497 8.0817 0.4900 0.2276 
-
[2.3555] [-1.9796] [0.6094] [ 1.3215] [ 0.4922] [0.421 I] 
D(LPREN(-I» 0.1758 -0.0957 -0.0298 -8.2518 0.2403 -0.3208 
[ 0.9344] [-0.3825] [-0.5437] [-1.41 J3] [ 0.2525] [-0.6208] 
D(LSCEN(-I» - 0.5705 1.1254 0.0409 -10.936 -1.3754 -0.2675 
~ 
[2.6365] [3.9124] [ 0.6478] [-1.6261] [-1.2563] [-0.4500] 
D(LSCEN(-2» 0.4924 1.0374 0.0261 7.6252 0.3047 -0.7089 
-
[2.842 1] [4.5039] [ 0.5163] [ 1.4158] [ 0.3476] 
, 
[-1.4895] 
D(LLFXP (-1» 2.1639 3.2277 0.0458 -7.6623 -3.5422 0.5452 
a 
[2.1503] [2.4127] [0.15pO] [-0.249] [-0.6956] [ 0.1972] 
D(LLFXP (-2» 0.3109 -0.9247 -0.0222 117.8966 0.1027 -1.4430 
[ 0.3594] [-0.8039] [-0.0880] [ 4.3834] [ 0.0235] [-0.6071] 
D(LEDUC (-I» 0.0232 0.0360 0.0010 0.3871 0.0278 -0.0041 
[ 3.2972] [ 3.8537] [ 0.4821] [ 1.7705] [ 0.7802] [-0.2146] 
D(LEDUC (-2» -0.0080 -0.0075 -2.09E-06 -0.1139 0.0043 -0.0256 
[-1. 421!] [-1.0057] [-0.00J3] [-0.6552] [ 0.1477] [-1.6674] 
D(LHEAL (-I» 0.0468 -0.0538 -0.0183 -0.7741 -0.4139 0.2474 
[0.989] [-0.8559] [-1.3264] [-0.5267] [-1.7300] [1.9049] 
D(LHEAL (-2» 0.0913 -0.0015 -0.0106 2.4233 -0.1264 0.1110 
(2.0850] [-0.0252] [-0.8295] [ 1. 7803] [-0.5703] [ 0.9229] 
D(LINST(-I» 0.5682 0.7793 0.0283 -12.9600 -1.7280 0.1430 
-
[ 3.2739] [3.3780] [ 0.5597] [-2.4024] [-1.9678] [ 0.2999] 
D(LINST(-2» 0.3855 0.8449 0.0132 -4.0681 -0.8493 -0.1901 
-
[ 2. 683J] [4.4231] [ 0.3152] [-0.9108] [-1.J681] [-0.4817] 
C -0.0849 -0.0569 0.0033 0.4265 0.3584 0.0022 
[-3.2806] [-1.6539] [ 0.4359] [ 0.5302] {2.7367] [0.0303] 
Determinant Resid Covariance (dof Adj) 0.0000 
Determinant Resid Covariance 0.0000 
Likelihood 334.3629 
Akaike Information Criteria -13.2779 
Schwarz Criteria -8.7451 
...
t-statlstlc In brackets 
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. I d'Alppend'IX VI : Rob ustness Check on the Response 0fSOCla In lcators 
Error Correction D(LPTRN) D(LSTRN) D(LINFM) D(lEDUC) D(lHEAL) D(LINST) 
CointEql 0.18217 0.0743 0.0345 0.0203 0.0221 0.0014 
[ 2.5D3} [ 1. 645} [ 1.475} [ 3. 564} [ 2. 719} [D.399}
~ 
CointEq2 -0.4933 -0.2038 0.0482 0.0312 0.0139 -0.0059 
[-4. 875} [-3. 247} 
-
[ 1.482} [ 3. 938} [ 1.23D} [-1. 165} 
D(LPTRN(-l» 0.1337 0.2195 -0.0423 0.0412 0.0655 -0.0109 
-
[0..59D} {l.562D} [-0.. 581} [2. 324} [2. 593} [-0.. 965} 
D(LPTRN(-2» 0.0988 0.14028 -0.0825 0.0488 0.0224 -0.0056 
[ D.391} [D.895} [-1.D16} [2. 473} [0. 795} [-0. 448}
-
I D(LSTRN(-l» 0.0644 0.1422 -0.1263 0.0106 0.0436 0.0124 
[D.165} [D.588} [-1.DD7} [0.. 348} [1.DD3} [D.638}
-
D(LSTRN(-2» 0.5772 0.1479 -0.1057 0.0582 0.0525 0.0151 
[ 1. 954} [ D.8D7} [-1. 113} [2.517} {l .594} [ 1.D25} 
~ 
D(LINFM(-l» 0.7959­ 0.5980 0.6548 0.0566 -0.0973 0.0200 
[ 1.179} [ 1.428} [ 3.D18} [1.D72} [-1. 292} [D.593}
-
D(LINFM(-2» 0.4373 0.3608 0.1989 0.0986 0.0039 0.0193 
[D.596} [ D.793} [ D.844} {l .716} [D.D48} [ D.529}
-
D(LEDUC(-l» 4.6362 1.1974 0.0258 0.2631 0.0559 0.1539 
[ 2. 514} [J.D47} [D.D44} [1. 8222} [ D.272} [ 1. 675}
-
D(LEDUC(-2» 2.9007 0.6274 0.4310 0.6608 0.2918 0.0882 
[ l.4DD} [ D.488} [ D.647} [4.D73} [1. 262} [ D.854}
-
D(LHEAL(-l» 12.3073 1.6952 0.5780 0.3110 0.0800 -0.1256 
-
[3.451} [0.. 766} [D.5D4} [ 1.113} [D.2D1} [-D.7D7} • 
D(LHEAL(-2» 6.5793 -3.6160 -0.4410 0.4485 0.2394 -0.0255 
[2.42D} [-2.144} [-0.5D5} [ 2.1D7} [0.. 79D} [-0..188}
-
D(LINST(-l» 28.7830 I 4.9199 4.8905 2.4465 1.2231 -0.6687 
-
[3. 593} [0.. 99D} {l.899} [ 3.9DD9} [ 1. 369} [-1. 675} 
D(LINST(-2» 24.9983 - 7.1455 0.8753 0.4906 0.4166 -0.4781 
[3. 873} [1. 784} [D.422} [D.971} [0.. 579} [-1. 487}
-
C 6.8886 3.9855 0.0566 -0.3589 -0.0828 0.1650 
{ 4.1381 { 3.8591 { 0..1061 {-2.7531 {-D.4461 { 1. 989J 
Determinant Resid Covariance (dof Adj) 0.0000 
Determinant Resid Covariance 0.0000 
Likelihood 22.2409 
Akaike Information Criteria 4.5577 
Schwarz Criteria 9.0904 
...
t-statlstlc In brackets 
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